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Abstract
Heterogeneity in the demand for telecommunications services in South Africa is investigated
here in three contributions. The results of this research show that government interventions
in the telecommunications sector over the last decade have had significantly different effects
on different groups of consumers, and in particular that the rich have benefited more than
the poor. Heterogeneous consumer preferences are especially interesting to study in highly
unequal developing countries like South Africa, where the discriminatory policies implemented
during apartheid have resulted in a deeply divided society. For example, the results of the
first contribution show how the regulation of mobile termination rates (MTRs, which were
reduced by 90% between 2009 and 2017) accounted for around 60% of the reduction in quality-
adjusted postpaid prices in South Africa, used mainly by high-income consumers. However,
MTR reductions accounted for only 30% of the reduction in prepaid prices, typically used by poor
consumers. Quality-adjusted prices and the effects of lower MTRs have previously been studied
in developed countries where prepaid does not matter as much, and these studies have typically
used average, aggregate price data or data on an individual operator. In this contribution, the
effects of lower MTRs are evaluated using a unique dataset on 2,773 operator-level mobile tariffs
over the period between 2009 and 2017 in a developing country, South Africa. The variation in
prices at the operator level is further exploited to show that on-net and off-net prices converged
as a result of lower termination rates. This reduces the ability of firms with market power to
use high MTRs to generate tariff-mediated network effects to exclude rivals.
In the second contribution, the effects of consumer heterogeneity are further explored by
developing a structural model of demand and supply in a discrete-choice framework. We test
for the distributional effects of regulation and entry in the mobile telecommunications sector in
a highly unequal country, South Africa. Using six waves of a consumer survey of over 134,000
individuals between 2009-2014, we estimate a discrete-choice model allowing for individual-
specific price-responsiveness and preferences for network operators. Next, we use a demand and
supply equilibrium framework to simulate prices and the distribution of welfare without entry
and mobile termination rate regulation. We find that regulation benefits consumers significantly
more than entry does, and that high-income consumers and city-dwellers benefit more in terms
of increased consumer surplus.
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In the third contribution, we exploit the discriminatory roll-out of fixed-lines during apartheid
to Whites-only areas to study fixed and mobile substitution, using the same survey data. In our
discrete-choice model, individuals choose fixed or mobile voice and data services in a framework
that allows them to be substitutes or complements. We find that voice services are complements
on average but data services are substitutes. However, many consumers see data services as
complements. Our results show that having a computer and access to an internet connection at
work or school are more important than reducing mobile data prices by 10% in driving broadband
penetration.
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1 Introduction
There are significant differences in preferences for telecommmunications services among con-
sumers (see, for example, Grzybowski, 2014). However, there is very little research on how
consumer heterogeneity affects the outcomes of government interventions in the sector. This
question is studied here in three contributions. In the first contribution, 2,773 retail prices were
collected in order to assess the impact of the regulation of mobile termination rates (MTRs) be-
tween 2009 and 2017. The results show that MTRs explained significantly more of the reductions
in postpaid prices than prepaid prices, reflecting differences in the impact of MTR regulations on
rich (postpaid) and poor (prepaid) consumers. In the second contribution, heterogeneity in the
consumer welfare effects of entry and MTR regulation are considered using a survey of 134,000
consumers between 2009 and 2014. It turns out that entry and regulation benefited rich con-
sumers more than poor consumers, even though we would expect poor consumers to benefit the
most from government interventions. In the third contribution, we show how the discriminatory
rollout of fixed lines during apartheid to White households is perpetuating the ‘digital divide’ in
respect of broadband services. We use a discrete choice model to study whether fixed and mobile
services are subtitutes or complements, using the same survey dataset as above. We find that
fixed and mobile services are complements for consumers that own a computer and are weaker
substitutes for the employed, self-employed and for consumers that have an internet connection
at work or school. These characteristics describe higher-income and often White households,
who continue to benefit from the discriminatory rollout of fixed-lines during apartheid.
These questions and contributions are important because telecommunications services have
a significant impact on economic development. Research on the impact of the expansion of these
services at the country level shows significant transformations of economies and societies. For
example, Roller and Waverman (2001) show that the expansion of telecommunications services
leads to higher economic growth of between approximately 0.5%-1.5%, and that growth rates are
higher if access is close to universal. Qiang et al. (2009) find that a 10% increase in broadband
penetration results in a 1.21 percentage point increase in economic growth in developed countries
and a 1.38 percentage point increase in developing countries. Similarly, Czernich et al. (2011)
show that a 10% expansion of broadband services leads to a 0.9-1.5 percentage point increase
in economic growth. Hjort and Poulsen (forthcoming) show that expanding access to high-
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speed internet as subsea cables landed in a number of African countries, including South Africa,
boosted the number of businesses created, reduced unemployment and boosted productivity. The
benefits from the expansion of telecommunications services are not limited to internet access, and
considerable consumer gains continue to be reported in respect of the expansion of voice services
in developing countries (see, for example, Björkegren, 2018). Access to telecommunications
services therefore have important positive developmental outcomes.
The state has an important role to play in the roll-out of telecommunications services by,
for example, issuing licences, subsiding network roll-out and regulating prices. However, there
is very little research on the effects of such interventions using granular data on consumers. In
addition, there is very little research on consumer choices of telecommunications services in de-
veloping countries like South Africa, where most people use mobile services for communications.
This study is also of interest in developed countries, where mobile broadband is growing signifi-
cantly and may become a substitute for fixed-line broadband in future as technology progresses.
This has important consequences in many European Union countries, for example, where incum-
bent fixed-line network operators face substantial access and price regulation (see, for example,
Cardona et al., 2009).
The evaluation of individual-level data may also be of interest to regulators and policymakers
concerned about the role that regulation may have on inequality (see, for example, Baker and
Salop, 2015). Government interventions can have significant distributional consequences. For
example, Wodon and Zaman (2009) find that lower food prices would benefit non-poor consumers
at the expense of poor producers. Argent and Begazo (2015) show that reducing sugar and maize
prices by 20% could result in a reduction in poverty of 1.5% and 1.8% respectively by making
markets more competitive in Kenya.
The literature on the assessment of relevant markets and the impact of competition and
regulation largely focuses on developed countries using aggregate, country-level data. In respect
of papers that assess individual or household-level data, there are relatively few papers and these
largely consider data on developed countries. For example, Rodini et al. (2003) and Ward and
Woroch (2010) evaluate fixed and mobile access substitution using data on U.S. households. In
another paper, Suárez and García-Mariñoso (2013) use panel data on Spanish households for
the years between 2004 and 2009 to analyse substitution from fixed to mobile access services.
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But the effects of consumer heterogeneity on the welfare outcomes of government interventions
have not been emphasized previously in the literature. This is especially important in countries
like South Africa that have extremely high levels of inequality due to the discriminatory policies
employed during apartheid, and therefore where the effects of government intervention may be
very different in different segments of society. For example, the third contribution studies the
effect of rolling out fixed-lines to only White households during apartheid and the impact this
has today on perpetuating the ‘digital divide’ between largely rich, White people who are able
to use fixed-line broadband for high-usage applications and largely poor, Black people who have
to rely on expensive, limited use mobile data.
There are also no papers that I am aware of that provide a structural model of demand and
supply to assess the welfare effects of competition and regulation. Furthermore, telecommu-
nications prices are not typically analysed at the operator-level over time due to lack of data.
This is a limitation because telecommunications bundles change over time, typically improving
in quality. An important contribution here is the development of a unique dataset on 2,773
telecommunications service prices over the years between 2009 and 2017 on a range of fixed and
mobile voice and data services offered by each of the network operators in South Africa. In
addition, developed countries typically have full-coverage fixed-line networks while developing
countries have no or limited fixed-line coverage. The rollout of fixed-lines to Whites-only ar-
eas during apartheid allows us to assess fixed and mobile substitution in a developing-country
setting.
This thesis is divided into three contributions, which can be described in more detail as
follows. In the first contribution, the effects of a 90% reduction in mobile termination rates
(MTRs) are evaluated over the period between 2009 and 2017. The results show that prepaid
prices, mainly used by poor consumers, and quality-adjusted postpaid prices, mainly used by
higher-income consumers, declined by over 40%. However, only approximately 30% of the decline
in prepaid prices and 60% of the reduction in quality-adjusted postpaid prices can be explained
by lower MTR costs. On-net and off-net prepaid prices converged as MTR costs declined. This
suggests that mobile network operators did not fully pass through reductions in marginal costs
which indicates that operators have a degree of market power as they are able to charge mark-
ups over costs. Furthermore, incumbent operators’ ability to exclude rivals via on-net discounts,
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generating ‘tariff-mediated network effects’, is diminished after termination rates are regulated.
These results suggest that regulators in developing countries might consider reducing mobile
termination rates, not only in order to reduce retail prices directly but also to facilitate the
expansion of new entrants.
In the second contribution, we evaluate the distribution of the consumer welfare effects from
competition versus regulation in the mobile sector. In this contribution, six waves of a consumer
survey for the period between 2009 and 2014 are used, which consists of more than 134,000
individuals. First, a discrete-choice model is estimated allowing for individual-specific price-
responsiveness and preferences for network operators. Next, a demand and supply equilibrium
framework is used to simulate prices and the distribution of welfare in counterfactual situations
without entry and without regulation. Our results show that while a ‘rising tide lifts all boats’,
in that all consumers benefit from entry and regulation, high-income consumers benefit more
in terms of consumer surplus. At the same time, regulation and new entry result in a greater
increase in mobile penetration among poor consumers than among rich consumers. This suggests
that governments and regulators might consider how best to ensure that the benefits of entry and
regulation are extended more to low-income consumers, such as by imposing network coverage
obligations on licensees.
In the third contribution, we study substitution between fixed and mobile broadband con-
nections in South Africa using the same survey data used in the second contribution. As is the
case in many developing countries, mobile data is the most widely used means of connecting
to the internet in South Africa. Nonetheless, South Africa is different because fixed-lines were
rolled out almost exclusively to the White minority population during apartheid. In this con-
tribution, we estimate a discrete-choice model where individuals may choose one or both fixed
and mobile voice and data services in a model that allows them to be substitutes or comple-
ments. We find that fixed and mobile voice services are complements on average but that fixed
and mobile data are substitutes. However, there is a large number of consumers who see these
services as complements. In particular, having a computer makes fixed and mobile broadband
access complementary. Individuals with internet access at work or school facilities as well as
individuals who are employed and self-employed see fixed and mobile data as weaker substitutes.
In our counterfactual simulations, we show that having a computer and access to an internet
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connection at work or school are more important than reducing mobile data prices by 10% in
driving fixed and mobile broadband penetration. Our results suggest that policymakers and
regulators could consider means of expanding access to computers and internet at workplaces
and schools together with expanding access to fixed-line broadband and reducing mobile data
prices.
The rest of this thesis is organised in the following way. In Section 2, the price-effects of
the regulation of wholesale mobile termination rates are evaluated. In Section 3, the distribu-
tional consequences of regulating wholesale termination rates versus introducing competition are
analysed. An analysis of consumer heterogeneity in the complementarity or substitutability of
fixed and mobile voice and data services is presented in Section 4. Conclusions from all three
contributions are then discussed in Section 5.
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2 The effects of lower mobile termination rates in South Africa
2.1 Introduction
The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) reduced mobile termi-
nation rates (‘MTRs’), the price that mobile network operators (‘MNOs’) charge each other
for calls between networks, by 90% between 2009 and 2017. However, Armstrong (1998), Laf-
font et al. (1998b) and Gans and King (2001) show that lower MTRs can lead to higher retail
prices. This is because subscribers want to join the larger network where on-net discounts are
offered. High MTRs thus create ‘tariff-mediated network effects’, which intensifies competition
for subscribers and results in lower retail prices. This result can also be explained in the context
of ‘two-sided markets’, where profits from one side of the market (inbound calls) are used to
subsidise the other (retail prices) (Genakos and Valletti, 2012). Genakos and Valletti (2011)
find evidence that lower MTRs result in higher retail prices, in one of a series of studies on the
effects of MTR reductions on prices in OECD countries.
At the same time, MNOs may use high MTRs together with on-net discounts to exclude
new entrants (Laffont et al., 1998b, Calzada and Valletti, 2008 and López and Rey, 2016) or
to exploit their monopoly over fixed to mobile calls, and use these profits to expand the total
number of mobile subscribers (Armstrong and Wright, 2009). In South Africa, two years prior to
the entry of Cell C in 2001, mobile incumbents Vodacom and MTN raised MTRs for mobile to
mobile calls by more than 500%. Furthermore, there was a limited-coverage fixed-line network,
close to full mobile coverage over the period analysed and prepaid connection charges were close
to free, which means that the ‘market-expanding’ effect of high MTRs is not likely. These market
characteristics are quite different to the groups of developed countries studied previously, which
typically have extensive fixed line networks more likely to result in low retail prices, subsidised
by high MTRs.
The effects of MTR reductions in South Africa are tested here using a unique dataset on prices
collected from Research ICT Africa, Tarifica and from archive.org’s ‘Wayback Machine’. Hedonic
regressions are used to develop an index of quality-adjusted postpaid prices, rather than the more
limited ‘basket of use’ approach used in previous studies. Price indices for telecommunications
services developed by Statistics South Africa, the central statistics office, suggest that prices
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have been flat in nominal terms (declining in real terms, after taking into account the effects of
inflation). However, the price dataset developed here shows that prepaid and quality-adjusted
postpaid prices declined by more than 40% in nominal terms. Only approximately 30% of the
decline in prepaid prices and 60% of the decline in quality-adjusted postpaid prices can be
explained by lower MTR costs. There is some evidence that suggests that the remainder of
the price reductions is explained by increased competition. It turns out that on on-net and off-
net prices converged as MTRs declined, reducing the risks to competition from ‘tariff-mediated
network effects’.
The results suggest that regulators should continue pursuing further reductions in MTRs,
particularly where they are concerned about the possibly exclusionary effects of on-net discounts.
Furthermore, regulators and statistics agencies should ensure that quality-adjusted prices are
used instead of average package prices, which bias postpaid prices upwards.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, a brief review of the literature is
provided, followed by an overview of the telecommunications industry in South Africa. Next,
the methodology is discussed, followed by a description of the data and a discussion on the
results. A final section provides conclusions and policy implications.
2.2 Literature review
MNOs may set different MTRs for fixed to mobile (‘FTM’) and mobile to mobile (‘MTM’) calls.
Armstrong and Wright (2009) show that MNOs able to discriminate between FTM and MTM
MTRs will set the FTM MTR at close to monopoly levels, while the MTM MTR would be
set at or below cost. The latter result is driven by the fact that high MTM MTRs together
with on-net discounts mean that consumers prefer to join the larger network, which generates
network effects. These ‘tariff-mediated network effects’ intensify competition among MNOs
for subscribers (Laffont et al., 1998b and Gans and King, 2001). As a result of more intense
competition, profits from high MTRs are passed back to consumers via low on-net charges and
lower monthly subscription charges. Thus, MNOs prefer an MTM MTR that is low, in order
to ‘soften competition’. More recent research has shown that these results rely on expectations
being ‘responsive’, such that where an operator reduces prices, consumers expect an increase in
the operator’s market share (Hurkens and López, 2014). Where expectations are ‘passive’, the
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network effect is subdued, and in a duopoly retail prices even rise with higher MTRs. Where
competition is in linear (prepaid) prices, on-net prices are unrelated to MTRs since network
effects are limited, while off-net prices rise with MTRs. Nonetheless, the ‘waterbed effect’
(prices rise when MTRs fall) is expected when there are three or more networks.
MNOs set monopoly MTRs for FTM calls since they do not compete with fixed line operators,
and so ‘tariff-mediated network externalities’ are not generated (Armstrong and Wright, 2009).1
At the same time, profits from terminating FTM calls are passed back to consumers through
competition at the retail level. Where there are ‘market-expanding’ effects, pass-through is less
than 100% and MNOs therefore strictly prefer a high FTM MTR. However, in South Africa over
the period analysed (2009-2017), both MTN and Vodacom’s networks were close to full-coverage,
and network connection charges were close to zero (the price of a prepaid SIM card over the
entire period was close to zero). Also, mobile penetration increased as MTRs fell over this period
(see Figure 2). Thus, the ‘market expanding’ rationale does not explain the persistent use of
high MTRs.
That MNOs in South Africa, where there was a limited-coverage fixed-line network, raised
MTM MTRs by more than 500% between 1999 and 2001 (from R0.20 per minute to the FTM
MTR of R1.09 per minute), is something of a puzzle given the ‘tariff-mediated network external-
ities’ that arise. The former CEO of Vodacom claimed that they needed to equalise the MTM
and FTM MTR in order to comply with new non-discrimination requirements published by the
regulator in 1999 (Knott-Craig, 2009). However, they could have chosen the lower MTM rate
(R0.20) in order to comply with this obligation, if it was in their interests to soften competition
for mobile subscribers (already at the time anticipated to be far greater in number than fixed
line subscribers). That they did not do so means that we need to consider alternative economic
reasons that might explain high MTRs.
The first and most plausible explanation is that MTN and Vodacom raised the MTR in
1999 because of the imminent entry of Cell C, a third MNO, in 2001 (Aproskie et al., 2008).
Incumbents facing new entry are able to use ‘tariff-mediated network externalities’ to block
entry, since consumers prefer the larger network where on-net discounts are present (Laffont
et al., 1998b, Calzada and Valletti, 2008 and López and Rey, 2016)).
1The subscriber’s MNO has a monopoly over inbound calls because calls to the subscriber must be terminated
via the subscriber’s MNO.
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Nonetheless, there are other possible explanations for MTN and Vodacom choosing high
MTRs. For example, where operators are unable to discriminate between on-net and off-net
prices and compete in linear (prepaid) prices, profits increase by raising MTRs since each opera-
tor avoids discounting retail prices, which would generate high termination costs (Laffont et al.,
1998a). While this outcome is also a possibility where on-net discounts are permitted (as is
the case in South Africa), this is only where substitutability between networks is close to zero
(Laffont et al., 1998b). MNOs in South Africa are highly substitutable since prepaid churn is in
excess of 50% (Vodacom, 2009 - 2017), and therefore using high MTRs as a collusive device for
linear prices seems unlikely.
There are other theories explaining high MTRs based on operators discriminating between
heterogenous customers (Dessein, 2003, Dessein, 2004, Hahn, 2004, Jullien et al., 2013 and
Hoernig et al., 2014). For example, if light users receive calls but do not make them, then
operators compete vigorously for light users when MTRs are high but pass-through of revenues
from high MTRs to retail prices is not 100%, and operators favour a high MTR (Jullien et al.,
2013). If light users are price-sensitive, then the low prices that result have a market-expanding
effect too. However, these models apply to specific market settings, including that operators are
highly differentiated or that customers select their network based on the MNO chosen by friends
and family. Operators in South Africa, where churn among prepaid customers is high (more
than 50% for prepaid customers), are not highly differentiated. Furthermore, most consumers
do not select only one network, since they have more than one active SIM card (i.e. they are
connected to two or more networks at the same time): there are approximately 90m connections
reported by mobile operators, and only 40m persons aged 15 and older.
The most plausible explanation for high MTRs in South Africa is therefore exclusion via
‘tariff-mediated network effects’. Nonetheless, it is at least possible that MTN and Vodacom
chose high MTRs in order to exploit their monopolies over FTM calls (and pass this back to
consumers in the retail market) or wished to encourage unconnected users to take up their
services. If this were true, then we would expect to see a ‘waterbed effect’ when MTRs decline.
Testing for ‘waterbed effects’ therefore helps us test for the rationale for MTN and Vodacom
choosing high MTRs together with on-net discounts.
A number of studies have assessed the impact of reduced MTRs on retail prices in developed
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countries. However, developed countries typically have close to full-coverage fixed line networks,
and mobile operators have an incentive to set a high MTR to exploit their FTM monopoly
(lower MTRs result in a ‘waterbed effect’). Furthermore all of the empirical papers on MTR
reductions consider cross-country data, which makes testing for exclusionary effects difficult.
For example, Genakos and Valletti (2011) found that MTR reductions resulted in higher retail
prices in a study of more than 20 OECD countries. The same authors more recently found
that this ‘waterbed effect’ had disappeared over time in a study on an expanded group of 27
OECD countries, due to the diminishing role of fixed line networks (Genakos and Valletti, 2015).
Kongaut and Bohlin (2014) find that MTR reductions led to decreases in retail prices in a study
on 39 European countries. Veronese and Pesendorfer (2009) found no relationship between
MTR reductions and retail prices in a study on 39 OECD countries. Wernick et al. (2010)
find a strong relationship between reductions in MTRs and lower retail prices for services in 16
European countries. Grzybowski (2008) finds that reductions in MTRs for fixed line services
were passed through to retail prices by incumbent operators in the EU between 1998 and 2002,
resulting in retail prices that were 8.2% lower over the period.
Stork and Gillwald (2014) qualitatively evaluate the impact of MTR reductions in Kenya,
Namibia and South Africa. They find lower retail prepaid prices in all three cases. However,
their approach does not quantify the impact of lower MTRs, does not take into account non-
linear (postpaid) tariffs, including changes in the quality of postpaid tariffs over time, nor does
it take into account differences between on-net and off-net prices.
In the approach followed here, retail on-net and off-net retail prepaid voice prices per minute
are regressed on termination costs per minute. In addition, monthly subscription charges, ad-
justed for quality using the hedonic method, are regressed on termination costs per minute. The
hedonic regression approach holds package characteristics (such as minutes of use, gigabytes of
data etc.) constant. This technique, introduced by Court (1939) and popularised by Griliches
(1961), was motivated as a means of avoiding upward bias in the calculation of consumer price
indices by statistics agencies. Taking changes in quality into account can result in significantly
lower prices (Pakes, 2003).
Karamti and Grzybowski (2010) estimate hedonic price regressions for three mobile operators
in France, and found that the introduction of a third operator in the market caused prices to
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decline significantly and quality to improve significantly. While the quality-adjusted price index
for prepaid prices decreased significantly, quality adjusted postpaid price reductions were more
muted. Schöni and Seger (2014) compare hedonic price indices for individual mobile operators
in Switzerland, and find that there are indeed linear relationships between prices and prod-
uct characteristics, and that the hedonic models improve on the ‘basket of service’ approach
recommended by the OECD for price comparisons. Forenbacher et al. (2016) also estimate
quality-adjusted postpaid telecommunications prices for Croatia using hedonic regressions, find-
ing that quality-adjusted prices fell over time. Adjusting postpaid prices for quality is therefore
an important step in developing an informative dataset on postpaid price trends.
The literature on the effects of MTRs is extended here in a number of ways. First, the effects
of MTR reductions on on-net discounts is tested for empirically for the first time. Furthermore,
the impact of lower MTRs in a developing country with a limited-coverage fixed line network,
where an exclusionary rationale for high MTRs is more plausible, has not been tested for. Finally,
‘quality-adjusted’ prices have not been used in testing for the effects of lower MTRs.
2.3 Industry overview
Markets for telecommunications services in South Africa are highly concentrated. There is a
fixed-line network that has partial coverage (Telkom, the former fixed-line monopolist), which
supplies around 3m fixed lines out of 15m households. There are two full-coverage MNOs
(MTN and Vodacom, licenced in the mid-1990s), two smaller, partial-coverage MNOs (Cell
C and Telkom Mobile, which started operations in 2001 and 2009 respectively) and several
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), the largest of which is Virgin Mobile. Telkom,
the former fixed-line monopoly, owned 50% of Vodacom until 2009, after which Telkom began
offering mobile services (‘Telkom Mobile’) directly in the fourth quarter of 2010. Cell C and
Telkom Mobile currently roam on the Vodacom and MTN networks respectively outside of their
coverage areas, while Virgin Mobile is an MVNO on the Cell C network. There are therefore only
two full-coverage MNOs and good reasons to be concerned about high levels of concentration.
MTRs can be commercially negotiated between network operators or set by the telecom-
munications regulator, and may be different for fixed to mobile (‘FTM’) and mobile to mobile
(‘MTM’) calls. MTRs were set by commercial negotiation initially in the mid-1990s, when MTN
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and Vodacom agreed on MTRs at R0.20 per minute for MTM calls and R1.09 for FTM calls.
The MTM MTR was later raised by 500% to the FTM MTR in the two years leading up to Cell
C’s entry in 2001 to R1.09 (Knott-Craig, 2009). The converged MTR reached R1.25 per minute
during peak hours in 2009, which is especially high given that cost-based MTRs on the MTN
and Vodacom networks was R0.13 in 2017.
At the same time that Telkom sold its stake in Vodacom and entered the mobile services
sector directly in 2009 and 2010, pressure from parliamentarians and the government (which owns
in excess of 40% of Telkom) led to the reduction of MTRs by agreement between the MNOs
and the government. The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)
subsequently promulgated regulations that set maximumMTRs for calls to the incumbent (MTN
and Vodacom) networks, and a higher asymmetric rate for calls to smaller networks, in 2010,
according to a glide path. As a result, MTRs declined by 90% between 2009 and 2017 (see
Figure 1). The main question addressed in this paper is what effect this reduction in MTRs had
on retail prices in South Africa.
Despite the substantial reductions in MTRs, retail telecommunications prices have been
relatively flat in nominal terms over the period 2009-2016 according to Statistics South Africa
(see Figure 1). After accounting for the effects of overall inflation in South Africa, measured by
the Consumer Price Index (‘CPI’ on Figure 1), retail prices for telephone, cellphone and internet
services have fallen. In what follows, prices and termination costs are analysed in nominal
terms. As will become clear from the results set out below, it appears as though Statistics South
Africa has not captured improvements in postpaid package quality (improvements in package
characteristics), nor reductions in prepaid prices, in the computation of telephone, cellphone and
internet price indices. This has likely resulted in an upward bias in the overall consumer price
index.
The market shares of incumbent operators MTN and Vodacom, measured by number of
active subscribers, have declined only marginally while new entrants Cell C, Telkom Mobile and
Virgin Mobile, have grown their market shares by only a small amount (see Figure 2). At the
same time, mobile penetration and therefore the number of subscribers on each network has
increased significantly. Mobile penetration increased from 76% in 2010 to 89% in 2014 (South
African Audience Research Foundation (SAARF), 2009-2014; see Figure 2). Both prepaid and
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Figure 1: Telecommunications price indices in the Statistics South Africa consumer price
index (Monthly, 2008-2016)
Sources: Consumer price index: Statistics South Africa (2016); Termination rates: Government Gazettes. Note:
On the termination rates graph, ‘S’ and ‘L’ denotes small and large operator respectively.
postpaid subscribers grew in number between 2010 and 2014. However, the number of prepaid
customers grew more quickly than postpaid customers. Consumers on postpaid plans increased
from 8% in 2010 to 9% of all consumers, including the unconnected, in 2014, while consumers
on prepaid plans grew from 68% of all consumers in 2010 to 80% in 2014. There is therefore a
significant shift among consumers towards using prepaid plans.
2.4 Methodology
Our objective is to test for a relationship between retail prices and MTRs, which may be pos-
itively related if high MTRs are used for exclusionary purposes, or negatively related if low
MTRs ‘soften competition’ or are used for ‘market-expanding’ purposes. Where high MTRs
are chosen for exclusionary purposes, we would expect MTR reductions to result in lower retail
prices. Where low MTRs result in a ‘softening of competition’ or are used for ‘market expanding’
purposes we would expect a ‘waterbed effect’ (higher retail prices).
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Sources: Operator market shares are calculated from the number of connections in operator annual reports and
public statements. The share of prepaid, postpaid and unconnected consumers is calculated from South African
Audience Research Foundation (SAARF) (2009-2014).
The quality-adjusted postpaid prices, and prepaid prices (including on-net and off-net prices),
are separately regressed against the termination costs per minute faced by each operator in order
to estimate the impact of reduced MTRs on retail prices. The effects of lower MTRs are identified
both in variation over time and in variation between operators, since larger operators charge
lower MTRs than smaller operators in South Africa, and termination costs vary by operator
depending on their market share.
The relationship to be estimated between prepaid (linear) prices and termination costs is as
follows:
Lijt = α+ βMTRjt +
5∑
j=1
λjMj +
n∑
t=1
τtDt + γPk + ψHHIt + µijt (1)
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where Lijt corresponds to operator j’s linear (prepaid) off-net price, or on-net discount (off-net
minus on-net price), for prepaid plan i in time period t. Off-net prices and on-net discounts
are regressed separately on the explanatory variables. Equation 1 is estimated using pooled
(i.e. all prepaid packages), mean and minimum prices per operator per quarter. The key
parameter of interest is β, which captures the impact of termination costs (MTRjt) on prepaid
prices. Termination costs per minute are calculated by weighting the MTRs using operator
market shares.2 Time fixed-effects (D) are included in order to eliminate any common time
trend in prepaid prices and termination costs if, for example, prepaid prices are falling in line
with telecommunications prices more generally and operator costs fall as the number of total
subscribers grows over time (see Figure 2). If not controlled for, these common time trends may
result in ‘spurious correlation’. A further dummy variable for ‘peak hour’ (Pk in Equation 1)
prepaid prices is included as most operators charge different peak and off-peak prices. Fixed-
effects for each operator (j) are captured by the coefficients λ on operator dummy variables (M),
and ψ captures the effects of changes in market concentration in each time period (t), measured
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Residuals are captured by the error term µ.
In order to estimate the effects of lower MTRs on postpaid prices (Equation 3), quality-
adjusted postpaid prices are developed for each mobile operator, using the hedonic pricing
approach. The linear hedonic model to be estimated is as follows:
Pijt = α+
m∑
i=1
βiXijt +
5∑
j=1
λjMj + τDt+1 +
5∑
j=1
γjMjDt+1 + ijt (2)
where Pijt are prices (P ) for package i offered by operator j in time t, Xijt are product charac-
teristics for package i offered by operator j in time t. βit are sometimes referred to as ‘shadow
prices’ for characteristics (Xijt), which may not be consistent over time (Pakes, 2003). In order
to calculate the quality-adjusted prices for each operator, data for adjacent years are pooled.
This constrains coefficients for product characteristics (β) to be consistent over the two year pe-
riod, which is the least pernicious constraint (Triplett, 2004). Mj are operator dummy variables
and λj are the brand premia or discounts consumers are willing to pay. τ , the coefficients on the
second-year dummy variables (Dt+1), are quality-adjusted prices in each year. The coefficients γ
2Termination costs per minute are calculated as follows: TCjt =
∑k
k=1 (Mkt × TRkt), where j 6= k and where
TCjt is operator j’s termination costs (TC) in time period t, Mkt is operator k’s market share in time t, and
TRkt is operator k’s termination rate in time t.
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are quality-adjusted price changes undertaken by each operator j in time t, measured by the in-
teraction of operator dummy variables (Mj) and the dummy variable on the second year (Dt+1)
for each pair of adjacent years. Errors are captured in the term ijt. The year (τt), operator
(λj) and operator-year interaction term coefficients (γ), are used to develop the hedonic index.
The relationship between quality-adjusted postpaid prices and termination costs is estimated
as follows:
Qjt = α+ βMTRjt +
5∑
j=1
λjMj + εjt (3)
where Qjt are quality-adjusted postpaid prices (Q) offered by operator j in time period t (esti-
mated in Equation 2) and β captures the effects of MTR costs per minute (MTRjt). λj captures
operator (Mj) fixed-effects. The HHI, used to measure changes in concentration in Equation 1,
is dropped in Equation 3 because the HHI is calculated using the total number of subscribers
(all operators do not report prepaid and postpaid subscribers separately), which more accurately
reflects changes in concentration in respect of prepaid customers since most consumers use pre-
paid packages. In any event, there are very low rates of postpaid consumer churn (less than 10%
in the case of Vodacom (2009 - 2017)), which suggests that annual changes in postpaid concen-
tration are likely to be minimal. Termination costs per minute are calculated by weighting the
MTRs paid by the operator by market shares, in the same way as they are calculated for the
prepaid estimation. The error term εjt captures any remaining variation. Note that there is no
time trend in the postpaid estimation, since this is captured in the first stage hedonic regression.
2.5 Data
There are 1, 314 quarterly prepaid price observations in the dataset (including peak and off-
peak), collected from from Research ICT Africa, from operator websites and from archive.org’s
‘Wayback Machine’.3 There are two observations for each prepaid price plan, one for peak hours
and one for off-peak hours. Each prepaid price plan also has different prices for on-net and
off-net calls. Descriptive statistics are available on Table 1.
Retail prepaid prices declined significantly over the period 2009-2017, as did termination
costs (see Figure 3). Prepaid prices declined in 2013 to as low as R0.50 per minute off-net and
3Prepaid and postpaid prices for 2017 were collected in September 2017. The prepaid price (collected in Q3
2017) was applied to all four quarters. Prepaid prices are not adjusted regularly and therefore this approach is
unlikely to affect the results.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: postpaid packages, prepaid prices and MTRs
N Mean SD Min Max
Prepaid price variables
Off-net (Rands per minute) 1314 1.76 0.74 0.50 3.50
On-net (Rands per minute) 1314 1.60 0.67 0.29 3.20
Peak (% of prepaid obs) 1314 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Mobile termination rate (MTR) variables
MTRs (Rands per minute) 1314 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.61
Market shares 1314 0.30 0.17 0.01 0.49
MTR costs (Rands per minute) 1314 0.32 0.22 0.09 1.24
Postpaid variables
Tariff (Rands per month) 1459 398.3 390.8 9 2965
Minutes included (all-net) 1459 106.9 244.8 0 3000
Minutes included (on-net) 1459 23.3 126.9 0 1000
SMS included 1459 99.0 229.6 0 1600
Data (GB) included 1459 0.88 1.98 0 10
Credit value per month 1459 136.1 259.7 0 1600
Unlimited package 1459 0.028 0.17 0 1
Device included 1459 0.29 0.46 0 1
R0.30 per minute on-net but recovered in later years as a temporary price war came to an end
(see Figure 3). There are minor exceptions to this general trend, such as where Virgin Mobile
raised its prepaid price from R1.99 to R2.60 in the second quarter of 2011, and eliminated
its ‘1 2 Free’ package towards the end of 2014, thereby resulting in the lowest price package
increasing from R0.99 to R1.29 in Q2 2015. Furthermore, Telkom Mobile increased its prices
for its ‘Prepaid Voice’ product in late 2012 and early 2013, while offering discounts based on
recharge value (the higher the value, the deeper the discount). ‘Bonus offers’ of this sort, as well
as dynamic discounts for on-net calls based on time of day and location, offered by MTN (Zone)
and Vodacom (4Less), are not used here. This is because data on these discounts over time are
not readily available, and in any event they are often offered as promotions and subsequently
withdrawn, which makes measurement difficult. This means that on-net discounts, particularly
by MTN and Vodacom, are likely to be understated in the coefficients estimated here. At the
same time, the declining price trends shown on Figure 3 are in line with declining average retail
voice prices reported by MTN and Vodacom in annual reports, which take into account all
discounts (Hawthorne, 2016). This means that the relationships between prepaid prices and
MTRs estimated here are unlikely to be biased significantly.
Off-net prepaid prices are typically more expensive than on-net prices, which suggests that
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Figure 3: Minimum and mean peak-hour quarterly prepaid voice prices (Rands per minute,
2009-2017)
operators employ on-net discounts to a significant degree (see Figure 3). Nonetheless, on-net and
off-net prices have converged to a significant extent at each operator, in line with the reductions
in MTRs (see Figure 3).
Average postpaid package prices (see Figure 4) remained stable between 2009 and 2017, at
approximately R400 per month, which is roughly in line with the Statistics South Africa price
index for cellphone services (see Figure 1). This is surprising given the changes in the market
over the period, and indeed motivates the use of hedonic price regressions to adjust for changes
in quality.
There are 1, 459 annual postpaid subscription observations in the dataset (see Table 1).
Postpaid prices were collected from archive.org’s ‘wayback machine’ and from Tarifica, an or-
ganisation that collates mobile prices, and from other industry analysts, including websites such
as MyBroadband.co.za, publications such as the ‘broadband bible’, and from operator websites.
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The value included in packages, such as the number of included voice calling minutes and
gigabytes of data (‘GB’), increased significantly over the period (see Figure 4). There are data-
only and voice-only packages, and therefore the minima for voice and data packages are zero.
A small number of data packages above 10GB was dropped from the dataset, since these are
likely to belong to a different product set competing mainly with fixed-line broadband (fixed-
replacement products).
Unlimited voice and data packages were introduced in 2013 and have grown as a proportion
of all packages offered, accounting in later periods for approximately 3% of packages. Unlimited
voice packages tend to have a ‘fair usage policy’ (‘FUP’), typically of 5,000 minutes.4 While
‘unlimited’ data packages also exist, these typically have a fairly low FUP, which varied over the
4The FUP for voice minutes was not recorded under the ‘minutes’ variable since it far exceeds the maximum
possible usable minutes.
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years between approximately 3GB and approximately 10GB.5
Other characteristics used in the hedonic regressions, including credit value, devices included
and packages available on contract vary from year to year and between operators somewhat but
do not increase significantly over time. Only one device (such as a smartphone or feature phone)
was selected per postpaid package in most cases. There are therefore typically two observations
per postpaid package: one with a device, and one without. This is unlikely to skew results
significantly since often there was only one device available per package at the point in time for
which data was collected (typically July in a given year) and in some instances a package variant
was available with a generic ‘device’ option. Where possible, the same device was chosen across
operators and across packages. Devices are only offered on contract (typically over 24 months),
and therefore the ‘device’ and ‘contract’ variables are collected in similar proportions.
MTRs declined significantly between 2009 and 2017 (see Figure 1), as did termination costs
(see Figure 4). MTRs are published in government gazettes, and operator market shares were
computed using operator annual reports and other publicly available information on the number
of subscribers per operator. While MTN, Vodacom and TelkomMobile announce their subscriber
numbers in annual reports, Virgin Mobile and Cell C do not and report their subscriber numbers
only periodically in the press.6 Small operators have higher termination costs per minute than
large operators, though these costs have declined significantly in recent years and have converged
to a significant extent with those of large operators (see Figure 4 and Figure 3). There are two
categories of MTRs: one for large operators (incumbents) and one for small operators (new
entrants). Prior to March 2013, there were different MTRs for peak and off-peak time periods
(see Figure 1). Peak and off-peak MTRs converged in March 2013 as part of ICASA’s regulatory
intervention. Because prepaid prices have peak and off-peak rates, they were regressed against
peak and off-peak termination costs. However, only peak MTR costs per minute were regressed
against quality-adjusted postpaid prices since the latter do not differentiate between peak and
off-peak hours to the same extent, and because peak hour calls likely account for the bulk of
postpaid customer calls (and therefore matter the most for costs). Further details on MTRs,
5The maximum data allowance under unlimited was recorded under the data allowance variable as far as
possible.
6Virgin in particular reported its subscribers only once, and therefore we have used the same number (0.5m)
over the period analysed. Publicly available information, including the AMPS survey (South African Audience
Research Foundation (SAARF), 2009-2014) shown on Figure 2, suggests that Virgin Mobile has not grown
significantly in South Africa.
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operator market shares and MTR costs can be found in Table 1.
2.6 Results
Termination costs have a positive relationship with off-net prepaid voice prices and on-net dis-
counts (see Table 2). A R1 reduction in termination costs results in a reduction in linear off-net
prices of between R0.50 and R0.68 per minute, and in a reduction in the difference between
off-net and on-net prices of between R0.30 and R0.53 per minute. The time fixed-effects are in
some cases substantial and negatively related to price (prices declined over time). There is also
evidence that changes in concentration are also positively related to off-net prepaid prices in
the termination cost model (i.e. as markets become less concentrated, prices fall; see Table 2).
An increased in 1,000 HHI points results in a reduction of almost R1 in off-net prepaid prices,
though we could not reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between HHI and
on-net discounts at even the 10% level of significance.
Overall over the period 2009-2017, average on-net prepaid prices declined by 36%, while
average off-net prepaid prices declined by 43%. The minimum on-net price offered by each
operator declined by 38% on average over all five operators, and the minimum off-net price
declined by 53%. The difference between average on-net and off-net prices was almost eliminated
over the period, though only 45% of the difference between minimum off-net and on-net charges
was eliminated.
However, the reduction in prepaid prices and on-net discounts attributable to lower MTR
costs was only 12% in respect of mean off-net prices (28% of the overall decline of 43%) and
18% in respect of minimum off-net prices (34% of the overall reduction of 53%). The remainder
of the decline in prices is due to reductions in concentration and time trends. Thus, reducing
MTRs plays an important role in reducing off-net prepaid prices, though this effect is somewhat
muted once time trends and reductions in concentration are accounted for.
On-net discounts, in respect of mean prices offered by operators, declined by R0.28 per
minute as a result of lower MTR costs (almost eliminating the difference between on-net and
off-net prices in 2009, which was R0.31 per minute). In respect of minimum on-net and off-net
prices offered by each operator, on-net discounts declined by R0.25 as a result of lower MTR
costs, thus eliminating close to half the on-net / off-net differential in 2009 (0.55 on average
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Table 2: Estimation results - prepaid, termination costs
Pooled prices Mean prices Minimum prices
Off-net
price
On-net
discount
Off-net
price
On-net
discount
Off-net
price
On-net
discount
MTR cost 0.57** 0.30*** 0.50** 0.49** 0.68*** 0.53**
(0.2) (0.09) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
HHI (’000) 0.78*** 0.13 0.91*** 0.23 0.92*** 0.17
(0.2) (0.08) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
MTN 0.45*** 0.051* 0.48*** 0.067 0.31*** -0.080
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Telkom(M) -0.22** 0.15*** -0.23*** 0.13** 0.13** 0.15**
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Virgin 0.12 0.54*** 0.13* 0.57*** 0.51*** 0.57***
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Vodacom 0.47*** 0.11*** 0.50*** 0.12* 0.24*** 0.087
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
2010 -0.050 -0.036 -0.12+ -0.12+ -0.090 -0.092
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
2011 0.030 -0.028 -0.014 -0.11+ -0.015 -0.066
(0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
2012 -0.016 0.058+ -0.042 -0.036 -0.029 -0.017
(0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
2013 0.036 0.061* 0.046 0.061 0.014 0.10+
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
2014 -0.12+ 0.032 -0.18** 0.10+ -0.18*** 0.064
(0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
2015 -0.20** 0.020 -0.19** 0.076 -0.18** -0.0017
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
2016 -0.079 -0.012 -0.12+ -0.016 -0.049 -0.014
(0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Peak 0.31*** 0.038* 0.30*** 0.083** 0.16*** 0.042
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant -1.69** -0.55+ -2.14*** -0.99+ -2.70*** -0.89
(0.6) (0.3) (0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6)
R-squared 0.38 0.29 0.75 0.53 0.79 0.55
Number of obs 1314 1314 346 346 346 346
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ‘Pooled’ means all prepaid prices in the dataset, ‘minimum’ means the
minimum available price offered by an operator in each quarter, and ‘mean’ means the average price offered by
each operator in each quarter.
across the operators). This which means that any ‘tariff-mediated network effects’ generated by
on-net and off-net price differences were more muted as MTRs declined.
Incumbent operators MTN and Vodacom charge higher prepaid prices than Cell C, Virgin
Mobile and Telkom Mobile do. This suggests that MTN and Vodacom may have market power,
though there may be other explanations. For example, they may be more attractive to cus-
tomers or have higher costs due, for example, to greater coverage, better customer service, etc.
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Figure 5: Postpaid quality-adjusted price index per operator, 2009-2017
Furthermore, at least Vodacom (and to some extent MTN) offers deeper on-net discounts than
Cell C does (the difference between on-net and off-net prices on the Vodacom network is more
than R0.10 higher on the Vodacom network than on the Cell C network; see Table 2). Note
that MTN and Vodacom’s prepaid prices exclude on-net dynamic discounts of up to 100%. This
means that the co-efficients on the MTN and Vodacom dummies in the on-net discount models
may be biased downwards (i.e. they may in fact offer even deeper on-net discounts than Cell C
does).
The first stage hedonic regressions on postpaid prices shows that quality-adjusted postpaid
prices declined among most operators, and on average by 40%, over the period between 2009 and
2017 (see Figure 5). The ‘implicit price’ of a voice call declined from approximately R1.50 per
minute in 2009/2010 to R0.60 per minute in 2016/2017. The price for data was approximately
R200 per gigabyte (GB) in 2009/2010, and this declined to approximately R50/GB in 2016/2017.
The price for adding a device increased over the period, from around R32 in 2009/2010 to almost
R250 in 2016/2017. This reflects declining handset subsidies over the period (see, for example,
TechCentral.co.za, 2010). An unlimited plan typically added more than R1,500 to monthly bills
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in 2012/2013, though this has declined significantly to less than R700 in 2016/2017. Taking out
a 12 or 24 month contract reduces the average price of packages in some periods, and in some
cases significantly (by R70 or more per month).
The postpaid results show how important it is to adjust for quality (product characteristics).
Without adjusting for quality, there is either no or a negative relationship between package prices
and termination costs (see Table 4). After adjusting for quality, the results show that postpaid
prices and termination costs are positively related. We can reject the null hypothesis that there
is no relationship between quality-adjusted prices and termination costs at even the 0.1% level
(see Table 4). A R1 reduction in termination costs per minute reduces average quality-adjusted
postpaid package prices by R167. The reduction in MTRs, which resulted in a R0.58 reduction
in termination costs per minute, therefore reduced postpaid prices on average by R97 (25% of
the average price of almost R382 in 2009).
Incumbent operators MTN and Vodacom charge higher postpaid package prices than newer
entrants Cell C, Virgin Mobile and Telkom Mobile. As discussed above, while these results are
consistent with MTN and Vodacom having market power there may be other explanations, in-
cluding that MTN and Vodacom are more desirable in the eyes of consumers or have higher costs
due to having greater coverage and better customer service. Nonetheless, MTN and Vodacom
certainly have persistently high market shares, accounting for more than 75% of the market in
terms of numbers of subscribers (see Figure 2) and even more, measured by revenue. These
persistently high market shares are consistent with market power.
The lack of competition reflected in these results is confirmed in concerns raised in policy
documents including the ICT White Paper, government’s proposed policy for the ICT sector in
South Africa (Government of South Africa, 2016), and by independent research houses including
Research ICT Africa (2016) which show that prices for telecommunications services in South
Africa are significantly more expensive than in other African countries.
These results also suggest that both prepaid and quality-adjusted postpaid prices declined
substantially over the period 2009-2017, contrary to the price indices developed by Statistics
South Africa for telecommunications services (see Figure 1).
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Table 3: Estimation results - hedonic regressions (adjacent years, 2009-2017)
09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17
Mins(a) 1.5*** 1.5*** 1.4*** 1.4*** 1.3*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.6***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Mins(o) 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.3+ -0.1 0.3** 0.3*** 0.2**
(0.1) (0.04) (0.07) (0.2) (0.4) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
GB 197*** 174*** 106*** 86*** 63*** 36*** 52*** 56***
(3.7) (3.7) (4.6) (5.2) (6.3) (6.4) (5.3) (4.9)
Credit 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.7*** 0.8*** 0.7***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Dev 32.3* 38.9** 82.1*** 89.1** 178*** 199*** 204*** 244***
(13.5) (13.6) (24.0) (29.2) (30.2) (27.1) (25.0) (31.5)
Unlim 1514*** 1337.3*** 1090*** 876*** 667***
(89.6) (50.5) (47.9) (55.0) (60.3)
Contr -10.1 -44.9** -77.6** 5.3 7.9 -32.8 -17.4 -69.5*
(13.2) (14.3) (23.7) (24.9) (28.9) (28.1) (24.9) (27.7)
MTN 30.8+ 47.4* 99.9** 44.4 -5.6 92.6+ 89.4* 93.6*
(17.1) (21.1) (31.9) (39.1) (45.2) (47.5) (38.7) (45.8)
Telk -56.2* -26.9 40.8 -29.3 -34.4 53.1 -119.5** -0.0
(25.6) (27.9) (40.5) (42.2) (48.9) (50.6) (44.6) (59.0)
Virg -20.4 -20.6 69.1+ -3.9 -171.5** -98.3 -130.8** -124.9*
(22.3) (23.9) (41.6) (46.3) (58.3) (60.2) (43.5) (61.1)
Voda 43.6** 45.7* 71.3* 87.6* 47.3 62.9 60.4 197.6***
(15.6) (17.8) (27.6) (35.2) (43.3) (44.4) (38.6) (46.6)
yt+1 23.0 -60*** 12.4 50.2 -128.3** 20.9 -55.2 -84.4
(15.5) (17.8) (31.6) (36.1) (41.3) (41.4) (40.2) (52.7)
MTN × -11.0 27.7 -74.4 -44.9 116.9+ -13.5 40.4 71.8
yt+1 (23.8) (27.4) (45.3) (53.3) (59.8) (63.5) (56.5) (66.6)
Virg × -19.2 110*** -31.7 -77.7 146.2+ -17.4 64.5 122.8
yt+1 (26.1) (30.4) (52.4) (61.8) (75.7) (74.4) (64.2) (82.4)
Voda × -22.9 2.0 -26.4 -53.6 15.6 6.5 183.5** -89.2
yt+1 (21.0) (23.9) (40.0) (47.5) (58.3) (58.9) (57.5) (68.8)
Telk × 53.8 -79.9 -24.3 106.1+ -192.9** 162.3* -217.7*
yt+1 (33.2) (50.5) (55.3) (63.2) (67.9) (69.7) (87.3)
Const 19.0+ 54.2*** 7.5 -28.2 52.7 56.1 38.7 99.8*
(11.5) (13.9) (22.7) (30.3) (38.3) (39.8) (29.9) (41.3)
R2 0.97 0.96 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.77 0.81 0.76
N 239 291 323 331 313 349 391 385
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ‘Mins(a)’ refers to all-network minutes, ‘Mins(o)’ refers to on-net minutes,
‘GB’ refers to Gigabytes of data, ‘Credit’ refers to ‘Credit value’, ‘Dev’ means included device, ‘Contr’ means
contract and ‘Unlim’ means unlimited.
2.7 Conclusion
Prepaid prices and quality-adjusted prices declined by more than 40% over the period between
2009 and 2017 in South Africa. Over the same period, MTRs were reduced by 90%. However,
only a relatively small proportion of the reduction in prepaid prices (around 30%) and the
reduction in quality-adjusted postpaid prices (60%) can be accounted for by changes in MTR
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Table 4: Estimation results - quality adjusted price index and termination rates
Mean
prices
Quality
adjusted
prices
MTR cost per minute -64.4+ 166.5***
(36.0) (25.6)
MTN 63.6+ 156.9***
(31.5) (22.4)
Telkom(M) 0.08 -132.2***
(32.1) (22.9)
Virgin -59.1+ -28.0
(31.2) (22.2)
Vodacom 90.9** 127.4***
(31.7) (22.6)
Constant 383.0*** 198.6***
(27.3) (19.5)
R-squared 0.50 0.85
Number of obs 44.00 44.00
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Standard errors in parentheses.
costs. Thus, the effects of lower MTR costs were not fully passed through to consumers.
Statistics South Africa’s findings that prices remained flat or even increased do not appear
to take into account improvements in postpaid product characteristics and lower prepaid prices,
which suggests that greater emphasis be placed on quality changes and on prepaid prices.
The most striking result is the reduction by approximately 50% or more of the difference
between off-net and on-net prices, the ‘on-net discount’. This means that lower MTRs has re-
duced the risks arising from ‘tariff-mediated network externalities’, which can result in exclusion.
While the market shares of Cell C and Telkom Mobile (new entrants) expanded between 2009
and 2017, MTN and Vodacom (incumbents) continue to dominate more than 75% of the market
(measured by number of subscribers; their share is higher measured by revenue).
The first policy implication of these results is that regulators concerned about the expansion
of new entrants and competition in retail tariffs should implement MTR reductions. This is
especially the case in developing countries, where fixed line networks are more limited and
therefore where the choice of high MTRs is likely to be more worrisome in the presence of
new entry, due to their exclusionary rationale. In South Africa, even further MTR reductions
are needed given the limited expansion of new entrants and the success in previous reductions
resulting in lower retail prices. A ‘bill and keep’ (zero termination rate) regime, implemented
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in the USA, Canada and Hong Kong, should be considered. Further policy interventions might
be necessary to facilitate new entry, including by means of providing open access to incumbent
infrastructure.
Finally, the results suggest that incumbent operators MTN and Vodacom are able to charge
significantly higher prepaid and postpaid prices, while offering deeper discounts for prepaid on-
net calls. This means that these firms may command some degree of market power, though
this needs further investigation, including by obtaining prepaid prices after dynamic on-net
discounts are applied. The competition authorities and the telecommunications sector regulator,
ICASA, should be cautious about any consolidation in the sector (both Vodacom and MTN have
proposed acquiring other operators and sharing spectrum), and should review market power and
anti-competitive conduct in the sector.
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3 Benefits of regulation vs. competition where inequality is high:
The case of mobile telephony in South Africa
3.1 Introduction
South Africa is the most unequal country in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.63 in 2015
according to World Bank statistics. This is a consequence of apartheid-era racial discrimination
policies (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). The top 10% of income earners earn thirty times more than
the bottom 10%. As a result of these high levels of inequality, policymakers are under pressure
to find means of reducing inequality. One such policy lever is reducing the prices of consumer
services through greater competition and the regulation of firms with market power.
The mobile telecommunications sector is a prime example of an industry in which the num-
ber of competitors, and thus to some extent competition, is under state control. In partcular,
the State assigns radio frequency spectrum licenses.7 Despite competition between four network
operators in South Africa, the prices of mobile services are high compared to other African and
developing economies (Calandro and Chair, 2016).8 Moreover, the regulation of termination
rates, which are the prices mobile operators charge one another for inbound calls to their net-
works, has proved to be an effective way of reducing retail prices (see, for example, Genakos and
Valletti, 2015). Recently, mobile termination rates (MTRs) have been reduced in many African
countries, including in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania
and Zambia (Mothobi, 2017).
Competition policy and sector-specific regulation of industries such as telecommunications
may help to reduce income inequality. This is because mobile telecommunications services
account for up to 5% of the bottom income quartile’s expenditure in South Africa, for example
(see Figure 6).9 But there are limits to the impact of competition and regulation. For example,
mobile operators enter the most attractive local markets first, which are in general urban areas
7Typically, regulators make radio frequency spectrum available to licensees, via auctions or beauty contests,
and therefore establish the market structure for the sector.
8This is reflected in recent political debates in South Africa which led to market inquiries into the cost of data
services, launched by the South African Competition Commission in 2017 and the Independent Communications
Authority of South Africa in 2018.
9Based on authors’ computations using the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS), which is a nationwide
survey of South African individuals and households collected by the Southern Africa Labour and Development
Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town (UCT) in four waves: 2008, 2010/2011, 2012 and
2014/2015 (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, 2008-2016).
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with higher average income levels. At the same time, since spectrum licences typically impose
coverage obligations on firms, competition should eventually also spread to rural and other areas
with lower income levels. These coverage obligations should guarantee that the majority of the
population benefits from competition between mobile networks, but the reality may be different.
Furthermore, regulators in general do not control how operators set their prices with respect to
different market segments. In countries with a relatively small share of wealthy consumers and
large numbers of poor consumers, firms may not be willing to lower prices enough to attract less
profitable consumers.
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Figure 6: Share of spend on mobile by income segments (NIDS, 2008-2015)
Source: NIDS survey waves 2008-2015. Net income levels per month are shown on the graph.
In this paper, we use six waves of a South African survey of about 134,000 individuals
collected between 2009 and 2014 to estimate the distribution of benefits across different segments
of society resulting from the entry of new market players and the regulation of mobile termination
rates.10 South African society is multi-racial, multi-lingual and highly segmented with respect to
10We use data from the All Media Product Survey (AMPS) survey produced by the South African Audience
Research Foundation (SAARF).
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income, which results in differences in the affordability of mobile telecommunications services.
We estimate a discrete-choice model allowing for individual-specific price-responsiveness and
preferences for network operators. Overall, we find that the price sensitivity of subscriptions
to mobile networks is impacted by income directly and by factors which indirectly determine
individual wealth and social group, such as race and language. We use the estimates of demand
parameters and individual price-responsiveness to conduct counterfactual simulations. First,
we simulate market outcomes in the absence of a new entrant, Telkom Mobile, which launched
mobile services late in 2010, and in addition without Cell C, which launched services in around
2002. Second, we simulate a counterfactual situation without the regulation of termination rates
which took place between 2010 and 2014.
Based on our equilibrium model, without the entry of Telkom Mobile and Cell C, we find
that the adoption of mobile phones in South Africa would be lower by about two percentage
points on average over the period 2011-2014. Thus, entry led to a relatively small increase in
the total number of adopters, though this effect is higher for low-income consumers. Without
entry, mobile penetration among high-income consumers would have been two percentage points
lower, while the reduction in penetration among low-income consumers would have been four
percentage points. We also use the model to simulate changes in consumer welfare for different
income groups and segments of society. In this way, we test whether poor or rich consumers
benefit more from competition and regulation of firms with market power. We find that rich
people benefited more from entry and regulation in terms of changes in consumer surplus. Thus,
we find that entry does not reduce inequality but has the opposite effect. We also find that entry
has a limited impact on consumer surplus. Furthermore, we find that regulation of MTRs results
in significantly lower prices. Similarly, high-income consumers benefit from a larger increase in
consumer surplus. In addition, we find that regulation has a greater effect than competition does
on mobile penetration. In particular, absent regulation over the period between 2011 and 2014,
mobile penetration would have been eight percentage points lower among low-income consumers
compared to four percentage points among high-income consumers.
Our results provide important evidence on the distributional effects of competition and regu-
lation, which can be of use to policy makers in South Africa and other countries.11 We show that
11Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) show that higher penetration of mobile phones has a positive impact on
economic growth. Other papers on the impact of mobile phones on market outcomes include Jensen (2007), Aker
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a ‘rising tide lifts all boats’, in that bringing about lower prices through competition and regula-
tion benefits all consumers. However, the distribution of these benefits, measured by changes in
consumer surplus, is skewed towards higher-income consumers and residents in towns and cities.
Policymakers need to consider means by which new entrants could be encouraged to focus on
low-income consumers and on rural areas.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses relevant literature.
Section 3.3 describes the market being analysed. Section 3.4 presents the data which we use
in the estimation. Section 3.5 introduces the econometric framework. Section 3.6 presents the
estimation results and finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
Our paper contributes to various streams of the literature. First, we estimate demand for
telecommunications using a discrete-choice model, a common approach used in previous research
to estimate price elasticities and the effects of entry. For example, Train et al. (1987) use data
from a US household survey and develop a nested logit model of consumer choices of telephone
services. Price elasticities are estimated for a number of service options which vary based on
distance. They find relatively high elasticities for monthly charges, which suggests that the
service options are substitutes for one another. Pereira and Ribeiro (2011) use a mixed-logit
model to estimate price elasticities for broadband Internet access using data from a household
survey in Portugal. They then simulate the price effects of the structural separation of the
incumbent dual-owner of DSL and cable broadband, and find substantial gains to consumers
from doing so. In another paper, Grzybowski et al. (2014) estimate demand for fixed and mobile
broadband services in Slovakia using a random coefficients model. They use their estimates
of price elasticities to define markets, and conclude that fixed and mobile broadband are in
the same market. However, we are aware of only one paper, by Björkegren (2018), in which a
structural demand model is estimated for an African country, in Rwanda. In that paper, the
author estimates changes in consumer welfare if taxes were shifted from handsets to usage of
mobile phones. He finds, due to network effects in the adoption of mobile services, that welfare
would have been 38% higher.
and Mbiti (2010), and Muto and Yamano (2009).
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Second, we contribute to the literature on the impact of mobile telecommunications services
on welfare and economic development using micro-level data. For example, Jensen (2007) anal-
yses the impact of the rollout of mobile services in Kerala in India on the dispersion of prices
for fish sold by fishermen at coastal markets. He finds that price dispersion decreased consid-
erably and that this improved welfare for fishermen and consumers. In a related paper, Aker
(2010) evaluates the effects of the expansion of mobile phone coverage in Niger on grain-price
dispersion. She finds lower price dispersion between grain markets as mobile coverage expanded
between 2001 and 2006, resulting in lower search costs.
Muto and Yamano (2009) use household panel data to analyse the effects of the expansion
of mobile networks on the sale of agricultural commodities in Uganda between 2003 and 2005.
They find that sales of perishable commodities (bananas) grew as a result of greater market
participation by producing households due to expanded mobile coverage. In a related paper,
Muto (2012) uses the same dataset to assess the effects of mobile phone ownership on individual
choices to migrate in Uganda. He finds that mobile phone ownership results in a higher likelihood
of migrating. Klonner and Nolen (2010) analyse operator and survey data to evaluate the
effects of the rollout of mobile networks on unemployment in South Africa. Their results show
significantly higher employment rates after an area receives mobile network coverage.
Aker and Mbiti (2010) survey the evidence on the impact of mobile telephony on economic
development in Sub-Saharan Africa, and conclude that the expansion in mobile usage improves
consumer and producer welfare. Finally, Hjort and Poulsen (forthcoming) assess the impact of
the arrival of high-speed broadband via subsea internet cables on employment and productivity
in African countries and find that they rise with access to high-speed broadband.
Third, our paper is also related to the literature on the impact of entry and regulation on
prices and welfare in markets for telecommunications services. Nicolle et al. (2018) use hedonic
price regressions to analyse the impact of regulation and investment on prices for mobile services
in France. They find that quality-adjusted prices declined between May 2011 and December 2014
which was mainly due to new entry and investment in 4G networks. Economides et al. (2008)
quantify the benefits of entry into local telecommunications service markets. They find that
consumers benefit significantly, though rather than resulting in reduced prices, entry results in
product differentiation and new plan introductions. In another paper, Genakos et al. (2018)
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study the impact of market concentration levels on prices and investment in 33 OECD countries
in the years between 2002 and 2014. They report that prices and concentration are positively
related and that increased concentration may lead to higher investment.
In respect of the impact of regulation on prices and welfare, gains from MTR regulation have
been reported on previously such as in Genakos and Valletti (2015). However, as far as we are
aware, there are no studies that comment on gains from MTR regulation in respect of consumer
surplus in a structural framework. Stork and Gillwald (2014) discuss the impact of termination
rate reductions in Kenya, Namibia and South Africa. They conclude that lower MTRs resulted
in lower retail prices and greater expansion of mobile services to differing degrees. While prices
fell rapidly in Kenya in response to lower MTRs, retail price reductions were slower in Namibia
and South Africa. This paper is based on a qualitative approach, however.
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on the impact of competition on inequality and on
welfare more generally. This is important in light of recent calls for a greater role for competition
policy in reducing inequality (see Baker and Salop, 2015). In a seminal paper, Deaton (1988)
proposes a methodology to estimate elasticities of demand using household survey data. The
purpose of their analysis was to improve the design of taxes and subsidies for commodities in
developing country governments, where the government is not able to raise general income taxes.
Argent and Begazo (2015) show that reducing sugar and maize prices by 20% by making markets
more competitive in Kenya could result in a reduction in poverty of between 1.5% (sugar) and
1.8% (maize). However, competition may not always benefit market participants belonging to
different income groups equally, and thus can affect inequality. For example, Wodon and Zaman
(2009) find that lower food prices would benefit higher-income consumers at the expense of poor
producers.
In highly unequal economies, firms may enter the market and compete for high-income
consumers, where they can earn higher margins, rather than provide services at low margins
to masses of poor consumers. However, from a welfare perspective, poor consumers should
benefit the most from access to telecommunications services, which may help them to get jobs
and escape poverty. In this paper, we detail how entry and regulation impact the well-being
of South African consumers in different income and societal segments. Our paper presents
important evidence on the distributional effects of government policies towards competition and
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regulation in telecommunications markets in South Africa and other developing economies with
high levels of inequality. We find that the regulation of MTRs is a more effective tool for reducing
prices than competition by means of new entry.
3.3 Industry
There are two full-coverage mobile network operators in South Africa, MTN and Vodacom, and
two partial-coverage networks, Telkom Mobile and Cell C. The latter two roamed on the MTN
and Vodacom networks respectively in the sample period.12
Vodacom and MTN began rolling out their Global System for Mobile (GSM) networks in
the mid-1990s, at around the same time that similar networks were being rolled out in other
countries. Cell C entered the market in late 2001, while Telkom Mobile entered in late 2010.
Cell C and Telkom Mobile focus largely on higher-income cities and towns. As a result of this,
the newer entrants have largely captured higher-income consumers (see Figure 7). The newer
entrants had poorer quality networks, due to the lack of seamless roaming and because 3G and
4G roaming was not available, at least in the earlier years in the sample period.
As a result of racial discrimination during apartheid, White consumers have significantly
higher incomes compared to other racial groups. Indian and Coloured consumers were discrim-
inated against during apartheid but benefited from having more access to public resources and
from living in urban areas. Many Black people were forced to live in rural ‘homelands’ with sub-
stantially lower funding for education and healthcare. Indian and Coloured consumers therefore
have lower incomes than White consumers though all three groups have higher incomes than
Black consumers.
Based on our data, operator market shares vary by race and income group (see Figure 7).
There are nine provinces in South Africa which have very different population groups. The
provinces of the Western Cape and Gauteng have significantly more people living in urban
areas, while the provinces of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the
North-West have large populations living in former ‘homelands’ which are largely rural areas.
The Northern Cape is a sparsely populated province that has a relatively small population.
12We dropped subscribers to Virgin Mobile, a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), from the analysis
due to its small market share which was much below 1% in 2014. In an alternative specification, we estimated
a model with subscribers to Virgin Mobile and include this provider in the choice set of all consumers. The
estimation results are comparable.
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Figure 7: Operator market shares by demographic segments (AMPS, 2009-2014)
Source: AMPS survey market shares for all observations over the period 2009-2014.
There are eleven official languages in South Africa which are, ranked by number of speakers:
Zulu, Xhosa, Afrikaans, English, Northern Sotho, Tswana, Sesotho, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda and
Ndebele. In the dataset, languages sharing common traits or a common geographic region are
grouped together. Thus, Zulu is grouped with Swazi and Ndebele (‘Zulu+’), while Sesotho, the
main language spoken in the largest cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria is grouped together
with Northern Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga and Venda (‘Sesotho+’).
Mobile network choices among language groups follow race group patterns.13
Cell C and Telkom Mobile have largely focused on urban areas, and their market shares are
therefore relatively higher in cities and towns (see Figure 7). Low-income consumers based in
rural areas have not taken up new entrant services, despite the new entrants having roaming
agreements with the full-coverage networks.
Termination rates are an important cost factor for voice services on mobile networks, as
13Note that Indian consumers largely speak English, while approximately three-quarters of Coloured consumers
speak Afrikaans.
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they are the charges that each operator pays for calls to other networks. The government
and Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), the telecommunications
sector regulator, began reducing mobile termination rates (MTRs) in 2010. At that stage Telkom
Mobile, owned partly by government, complained about high MTRs due to their imminent
entry.14 Since then, MTRs have declined by 90% and retail voice prices have declined as a result
of this, according to ICASA (see Figure 8).15 There are separate (‘asymmetrical’) termination
rates for large and small operators, as the regulations allow smaller operators to charge a higher
MTR. There were separate peak and off-peak termination rates until 2013, when the regulations
forced the MTRs to converge.
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Figure 8: Average operator prices and termination rates (2009-2014)
Sources: Prices from Research ICT Africa, Tarifica and the Internet Archive and termination rates from
government gazettes.
14Dividends from Telkom appear on the budget in the telecommunications line ministry’s annual report, and
appear to account for the bulk of incoming funds into that ministry.
15ICASA reviewed the effects of lower MTRs in its bi-annual review of prices. See: ICASA, 2018, “Bi-Annual
report on the analysis of tariff notifications submitted to ICASA for the period 02 January 2018 to 30 June 2018”.
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3.4 Data
We estimate a discrete-choice model using six waves of the All Media Products Survey (AMPS).
AMPS is a survey of approximately 25,000 consumers each year between 2009 and 2014.16 In
total, the sample size is more than 134,000 observations. The AMPS dataset contains consumer
choices of a range of products and services as well as personal and household characteristics.17
As can be expected, low-income consumers account for the bulk of survey respondents and are
disprorportionately less likely to be connected (see Table 5).
Prices were obtained from Research ICT Africa and Tarifica.18 In addition, we used an online
archive service, the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, to complete the pricing database.19
Prices were matched to consumers firstly by payment method (prepaid and postpaid).20 Second,
we matched prices using estimated usage of voice minutes. In this way, we arrived at a price per
minute for each operator faced by each consumer.
Prepaid consumers, which account for 81% of the sample with a mobile service, belong
to one segment. Postpaid consumers, which account for the balance, were divided into three
groups: low, medium and high voice users according to their declared monthly cellphone spend.
Low-usage consumers are assumed to have monthly bills in the range R1-R150 per month,
medium-usage is in the range R151-500 and high-usage is above R500 per month.21
16An exception is the year 2013, when only half that number is available due to a questionnaire change halfway
through the year. This meant that certain questions (such as cellphone spend) were not asked in the second half
of the year, which means it was not possible to use those observations.
17This is an annual survey conducted by the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF) on
buyers of a range of products, in order to match media companies (such as newspapers, TV stations and radio
stations) and advertisers of the various products surveyed.
18Research ICT Africa is a non-governmental organisation that collects data and conducts research on telecom-
munications in Africa. Tarifica is a market intelligence firm which collects information on prices of telecommu-
nications services worldwide.
19The Internet Archive, whose website is archive.org, is a non-profit organisation that records snapshots of
websites over time and makes these available to the public.
20In South Africa, most subscribers are on prepaid plans and are typically unable to choose between prepaid
and postpaid because they do not meet the income and employment requirements for a postpaid contract. This
is a result of low levels of employment and participation in the labour force. According to the “Quarterly Labour
Force Survey” undertaken by Statistics South Africa (publication P0211), the employed population divided by
the number of adults in South Africa (aged 15-65 years), i.e. the ‘labour absorption rate’, varied between 41%
and 46% over the period between 2009 and 2014. The unemployment rate varied between 22% and 26% using
the official definition (active job seekers) while the expanded definition (i.e. including discouraged work seekers)
varied between 30% and 36%.
21The South African currency is highly volatile but as of December 2018 one US dollar was approximately
14.6 Rands. Classifying consumers into high, medium and low usage groups is a standard approach to segment-
ing telecommunications subscribers. The spending bands were selected to broadly reflect regular intervals and
available mobile packages, and so as to ensure a large number of observations would fall within each category.
Approximately 25% of postpaid customers fall within the first group, around 53% fall within the second category
and the remaining 22% fall within the highest spend group. The second category has a greater proportion since
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Table 5: AMPS demographic variables, by operator (entire sample)
Variable None Cell C MTN Telkom(M) Vodacom N
N % N % N % N % N %
Income
<R3,000 9,821 31 2,351 7 10,453 33 51 0 8,979 28 31,655
R3-7,999 7,274 19 4,160 11 13,425 35 114 0 13,676 35 38,649
R8-15,999 3,918 12 4,302 13 11,281 34 161 0 13,937 41 33,599
>R15,999 1,943 6 4,228 13 10,512 31 199 1 16,511 49 33,393
Race
Black 12,244 17 6,368 9 27,641 39 177 0 24,717 35 71,147
Coloured 5,122 26 2,697 14 6,185 31 93 0 5,810 29 19,907
Indian 1,585 17 2,013 22 2,359 26 64 1 3,079 34 9,100
White 4,005 11 3,963 11 9,486 26 191 1 19,497 52 37,142
Language
Afrikaans 6,935 19 4,278 11 9,715 26 172 0 16,125 43 37,225
English 4,073 13 4,804 15 9,559 30 197 1 13,187 41 31,820
Zulu+ 3,306 16 2,121 10 7,223 34 63 0 8,514 40 21,227
Xhosa 3,618 23 1,205 8 8,002 50 20 0 3,140 20 15,985
Sotho+ 5,024 16 2,633 8 11,172 36 73 0 12,137 39 31,039
Settlement type
Rural 5,085 24 1,340 6 6,776 31 46 0 8,363 39 21,610
Town 8,334 18 4,485 10 15,354 33 148 0 18,265 39 46,586
City 9,537 14 9,216 13 23,541 34 331 0 26,475 38 69,100
Province
Western Cape 3,337 18 2,335 13 6,167 34 86 0 6,479 35 18,404
Northern Cape 1,891 28 743 11 1,821 27 17 0 2,295 34 6,767
Free State 1,726 16 958 9 3,901 36 32 0 4,243 39 10,860
Eastern Cape 4,866 25 1,743 9 8,113 42 55 0 4,340 23 19,117
Kwazulu-Natal 3,992 16 3,867 15 8,045 32 101 0 9,178 36 25,183
Mpumalanga 786 11 485 7 1,812 26 21 0 3,962 56 7,066
Limpopo 1,303 17 585 7 2,042 26 20 0 3,897 50 7,847
Gauteng 3,870 11 3,737 11 11,173 32 180 1 15,741 45 34,701
North-West 1,185 16 588 8 2,597 35 13 0 2,968 40 7,351
Age category
Age < 26 years 6,505 16 5,504 14 13,909 35 125 0 14,033 35 40,076
Age 26-50 years 7,158 12 6,631 11 21,850 36 289 0 24,885 41 60,813
Age 51-65 years 4,618 20 2,065 9 6,999 30 82 0 9,705 41 23,469
Age > 65 years 4,675 36 841 7 2,913 23 29 0 4,480 35 12,938
Additional
Unemployed 18,228 22 8,941 11 25,954 31 276 0 29,244 35 82,643
Employed 4,728 9 6,100 11 19,717 36 249 0 23,859 44 54,653
Not self-empl. 21,998 18 13,678 11 41,229 33 448 0 46,881 38 124,234
Self-employed 958 7 1,363 10 4,442 34 77 1 6,222 48 13,062
No home tel. 17,186 17 10,945 11 35,415 35 331 0 37,681 37 101,558
Home telephone 5,770 16 4,096 11 10,256 29 194 1 15,422 43 35,738
No work tel. 22,216 18 13,195 11 40,600 33 450 0 46,342 38 122,803
Work telephone 740 5 1,846 13 5,071 35 75 1 6,761 47 14,493
Female 10,681 16 7,386 11 23,618 34 217 0 26,919 39 68,821
Male 12,275 18 7,655 11 22,053 32 308 0 26,184 38 68,475
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Next, we computed average prices per minute for the four consumer segments. Prices for
prepaid and postpaid services are shown on Figure 8. We assumed different monthly usage
volumes for each segment: 30 minutes for prepaid users (1 minute per day), 180 for low-usage
postpaid consumers (6 per day), 540 for medium-usage postpaid consumers (18 per day) and
1,080 for high-usage postpaid consumers (36 per day).22 In South Africa, prices differ depending
on whether calls are on the same network (on-net), to other mobile networks (off-net) or are
terminated on fixed lines. We assumed that 10% of minutes are terminated on fixed lines and 90%
are terminated on mobile networks, for all consumers. Calls terminated on mobile networks are
distributed according to operator market shares. We also assumed that 50% of calls are made
in ‘peak’ periods and 50% were ‘off-peak’, for which there are different prices.23 Using this
call distribution pattern, we computed the average price per minute for all prepaid tariffs and
picked the lowest for each operator in a given year. We assume that these are the prices that
prepaid consumers face when choosing a service. In a similar way, we computed the average
price per minute faced by postpaid consumers belonging to the three segments. We tested our
results against different calling patterns and our estimates of elasticities are comparable in these
different specifications. Usage profiles are a common means of modelling consumer decisions in
telecommunications services as well as comparing prices across countries and over time.24
We tested the proposition that new entrants choose higher-income areas in towns and cities
by means of reduced-form regressions on a proxy for entry, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI).25 A lower HHI indicates a greater degree of entry. As we can expect, new entrants focus
almost 25% of postpaid customers spend between R271-R500 per month. Since there are many more packages
advertised in the R151-R500 spend level than above R500, it made more sense to allocate the R271-R500 category
to the medium-spend group.
22These usage categories are similar to the OECD mobile voice call baskets cited below, of 30, 100, 300 and
900 calls per month. The groups are also not far from minutes of use reported by Vodacom in its annual reports
between 2009 and 2014, for example, for prepaid and postpaid customers. Prepaid customers on the Vodacom
network used between 52 minutes and 116 minutes per month on average, depending on the year, while postpaid
consumers used between 182 and 240 minutes per month.
23This is in line with the OECD usage baskets mentioned above, which assume that 46% of calls are made during
the day, 27% are made during the evening and 27% over the weekend. In South Africa, weekend and evening calls
are grouped together under the ‘off-peak’ period. Source: OECD, 2017, “Revised OECD Telecommunications
Price Baskets”.
24See, for example, the OECD basket methodology, cited above.
25The HHI is calculated as follows: HHI =
∑k
j=1 (sj ∗ 100)2, where sj is the market share of operator j.
A monopoly results in an HHI of 10,000 (1002). AMPS reports the locations of respondents in each year by
province, by parts of the large cities of Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria, by secondary cities and
towns (Bloemfontein, Kimberley, Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth, East London, Vaal) and by community size
(metropolitan areas (250 000+), cities (100 000 - 249 999), large Towns (40 000 - 99 999), small towns (8 000-
39 999), large villages (4 000- 7 999), small villages (500 -3 999), settlements (less than 500), non-urban (rural)).
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Figure 9: Relationship between market concentration (HHI) levels and income (2009-2014)
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on areas that have a higher share of richer consumers (see Figure 9 and Table 6). Market
concentration levels are lower in towns and cities, and among high-income consumers, whether
measured by mean household incomes or the share of high-income individuals in a location.
Income, race and language group are correlated in South Africa. Therefore, higher-income
races (Coloured, Whites, Indians) experience lower levels of market concentration, and a similar
pattern is found among higher-income language groups (English and Afrikaans-speakers). This
suggests that new entrants target higher-income locations and population groups.
3.5 Econometric Model
3.5.1 Demand
Discrete choice model
We estimate demand for mobile subscriptions by means of a discrete-choice model, where
In total, there are 509 such location-years. We dropped location-years that had fewer than 50 observations, and
arrive at a sample size of 420.
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Table 6: Relationship between market concentration (HHI) and income measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Towns -311.28*** -318.98*** -236.02*** -249.74***
(68.77) (68.46) (62.45) (62.64)
Cities -408.07*** -424.06*** -276.15*** -221.09**
(80.50) (78.82) (73.41) (76.02)
Household income (mean) -0.01* -0.00 0.01+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
High income % of population -360.27+
(183.39)
Coloured % of population -724.27***
(107.89)
White % of population -376.44*
(180.03)
Indian % of population -2074.03***
(239.04)
English % of population -1333.12***
(138.78)
Afrikaans % of population -402.52***
(90.80)
Constant 4660.84*** 4615.95*** 4805.16*** 4712.46***
(75.63) (66.47) (72.83) (76.20)
R-Square 0.11 0.11 0.29 0.28
Number of obs 420 420 420 420
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note that the shares of race groups in the AMPS sample are as follows: Black (51.8%), Coloured (14.5%),
Indian (6.6%), White (27%).
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consumers choose the network operator that maximizes their utility function. We allow individ-
uals i = 1, ..., N to choose among network operators j = 1, ..., J . Individual utility depends on
network and consumer characteristics. In what follows, we skip the time subscript for year t.
We specify that individual i’s utility for mobile network j is given by:
Uij = x
′
j β˜i − α˜ipij + ij . (4)
Here, xj is a J × 1 vector of network dummy variables interacted with individual characteristics
and β˜i is a J×1 vector of coefficients denoting the individual-specific valuations for each network,
estimated relative to the base of having no mobile service. Furthermore, pij denotes the price paid
by consumer i for making a call on network j, and α˜i is a coefficient for the individual-specific
valuation of price. The construction of the price variable was discussed in Section 3.4. Finally,
ij is an individual-specific valuation for network j, i.e. the “logit error term”. It is identically
and independently distributed across mobile networks according to the Type I extreme value
distribution.
The vector of coefficients β˜i and the price coefficient α˜i may depend on observed individual
characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity. More specifically, we define:
(
β˜i
α˜i
)
=
(
β
α
)
+ ΠDi +
(
0
σα
)
νi , νi ∼ N(0, 1) (5)
where (β, α) refers to a (J+1)×1 vector of mean valuations. The vector of observable individual
characteristics, Di, has dimension d×1. The matrix of parameters Π with dimension (J+1)×d
captures the impact of individual characteristics on the valuations for the J network dummy
variables, xjt, and the price variable, pjt. The randomly drawn vector from the standard normal
distribution νi captures unobserved individual heterogeneity in respect of price. In addition, σα
is a vector of standard deviations around the mean valuations.
The vector of observable characteristics Di includes gender, age category (15− 25, 26− 50,
51− 65, 66 and above), race, language, province, income group (below R3, 000, R3, 000− 7, 999,
R8, 000 − 15, 999, R16, 000 and above, per month), employment status, whether the person is
self-employed and whether the person has a telephone at home or work.
In the special case, where σα = 0, there is no unobserved individual heterogeneity and we
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obtain the conditional logit model. In a more general framework, we have a mixed or random
coefficients logit model, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. The
utility function specified above allows for flexible substitution between network operators. This
allows us to assess which network operators are closer substitutes at the level of the individual.
An individual i chooses a utility-maxmizing network j, i.e. Uij = maxk∈Ci Uik, where Ci is
individual i’s available choice set. Hence, the probability that individual i with given coefficients
β˜i and α˜i chooses network j is given by:
lijt
(
β˜i, α˜i
)
= Pr
(
Uij = max
k∈Ci
Uik
)
=
exp
(
x′j β˜i − α˜ipij
)
∑
k∈Ci exp
(
x′kβ˜i − α˜ipik
)
where the second line arises from the distributional assumptions of the logit error term ij . In
the random coefficients model we need to integrate the conditional choice probability lij
(
β˜i, α˜i
)
over the distribution of α˜i:
Pij =
∫
α˜
lij
(
β˜i, α˜
)
f(α˜)dα˜, (6)
The distribution of α˜i was specified earlier in (5) and consists of an observable part and an
unobservable component that is normally distributed, νi ∼ N(0, 1).
Assuming independence of individual choices, the log-likelihood function can be written as:
L(θ) = yij
N∑
i
∑
j
log(Pij). (7)
Here, yij = 1 if individual i chose alternative j and yij = 0 otherwise, and θ is the vector
of all parameters to be estimated. We use a simulation method to approximate the integral
entering the choice probabilities Pij in (6). Following Train (2009), we take R draws for νi from
the standard normal distribution to obtain the average choice probability per individual:
P̂ij =
1
R
R∑
r=1
exp
(
x′jβ − (α+ σνri )pij + (x′j , pij)ΠDi
)
∑
k∈Ci exp
(
x′kβ − (α+ σνri )pik + (x′k, pik)ΠDi
) . (8)
In the special case of no unobserved individual heterogeneity (σ = 0), Equation 8 becomes the
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multinomial choice probability:
P̂ij =
exp
(
x′jβ − αpij + (x′j , pij)ΠDi
)
∑
k∈Ci exp
(
x′kβ − αpik + (x′k, pik)ΠDi
) .
Substituting Equation 8 for Pij in Equation 7, the maximum simulated likelihood estimator is
the value of the parameter vector θ that maximizes the likelihood function L.
Price Elasticities of Demand
We calculate own- and cross-price elasticities for voice calls on mobile networks in the fol-
lowing way. The effect of a one percent price increase by network k on the level of individual i’s
probability of choosing network j is:
∂Pij
∂pik
pik =
 −α˜iPij(1− Pij)pij if k=jα˜iPijPikpik otherwise .
This could be referred to as individual i’s semi-elasticity of demand for j with respect to the
price of k. Let the aggregate market share for network j be given by sj ≡
∑
i Pij/N , where N
is the number of consumers in the dataset in a given year. The aggregate elasticity of demand
for subscriptions to network j with respect to the price of k may then be defined as:
εjk =
1
N
(∑
i
∂Pij
∂pik
pik
)
1
sj
=

∑
i(−α˜i)Pij(1− Pij)pij/
∑
i Pij if k=j∑
i α˜iPijPikpik/
∑
i Pij otherwise
. (9)
Consumer surplus
We use the estimated model to calculate changes in consumer surplus due to regulation or
new entry. In discrete-choice models, the expected consumer surplus of consumer i is given by
(see Small and Rosen, 1981):
E(CSi) =
∫
α˜
1
|α˜i| ln
(∑
j
exp(Vij)
)
dα˜+ Ci
where αi is the individual-specific price coefficient, Vijt is the observed part of the utility function
in Equation 4 and Ci is an unknown constant representing unmeasured utility. The change in
consumer surplus due to an intervention, such as regulating termination rates or introducing
55
new entrants, can be written as:
∆E(CSi) =
∫
α˜
1
|α˜i|
∣∣∣∣ln(∑
j
exp(V 1ij)
)
− ln
(∑
j
exp(V 0ij)
)∣∣∣∣dα˜ (10)
where V 1ij denotes the utility after and V
0
ij before the intervention.
3.5.2 Supply
We use both the demand and supply-sides to simulate how the entry of mobile operators Cell
C and Telkom Mobile impact welfare and how consumer surplus is distributed across consumer
segments. For the simulations, we consider marginal costs to be call termination costs, calculated
using the termination rates in Section 3.3.26 We also simulate the effect of no regulatory inter-
vention. In order to do this, we compute marginal costs as though the pre-regulation (pre-2010)
mobile termination rates applied throughout the period between 2011 and 2014. In this simula-
tion we consider that mobile operators compete by setting call prices per minute in prepaid and
post-paid market segments separately. Prepaid consumers choose between prepaid offers from
different operators but they do not switch to post-paid offers, and similarly post-paid consumers
from each usage segment: low, medium and high.
The profits of firm f are given by:
Πf (p) = (pf − cf ) sf (p)L (11)
where cf is the marginal cost of firm f , and sf (p) is firm f ’s market share as a function of
the price vector. Market size is denoted by L. Assuming that firms choose prices to maximize
profits, the first-order conditions that define the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium are then given by:
sf (p) + (pf − cf ) ∂sf (p)
∂pf
= 0. (12)
for products j = 1, . . . , J . The choice probabilities and price derivatives of choice probabilities
26We computed the termination costs for each mobile operator as follows. First, we consider that 90% of calls
are made to other mobile networks (the other 10% are to fixed networks) and that calls to other mobile networks
are distributed according to market shares. We further consider that 50% of calls are made during peak hours and
50% are made off-peak, since termination rates were different for these two time slots. Using this information,
we computed an average termination cost per minute paid by each mobile operator in each year.
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are computed at the individual level, and then an average is calculated for each of the four usage
profiles (discussed in section 3.4) and for each operator and year. The FOCs can be written in
vector notation as:
s(p) + (I ∆(p)) (p− c) = 0. (13)
where p and s(p) are J × 1 price and market share vectors, ∆(p) ≡ ∂q(p)/∂p′ is a J × J
matrix of own- and cross-price derivatives. A J×J block-diagonal identity matrix, I, represents
ownership, and  denotes element-by-element multiplication of two matrices.
The system of first-order conditions (Equation 13) can be used to perform counterfactual
simulations. In the first simulation, we solve the system of equations after removing Telkom
Mobile and Cell C from the market, which we do by setting their marginal costs (and equilibrium
prices) to a very high number. The solution gives the counterfactual equilibrium price vector pˆ,
which contains only prices for the remaining mobile operators, Vodacom and MTN. In the second
counterfactual, we use the pre-2010 termination rates as marginal costs. In the simulations, we
calculate an average price per operator per year using the iterated best-response algorithm.
We then use this price vector to compute the counterfactual market shares, sˆ, and changes in
individual consumer surplus given by Equation 10. These can then be aggregated for different
population segments.
3.6 Results
When estimating the model we need to account for the endogeneity of the price variable. Con-
sumer choices depend on price but are also determined by unobserved quality differences. At
the same time, quality influences price. Following Petrin and Train (2010), we use the control
function approach to account for this endogeneity.
In the first stage, we regress the prices on a set of controls. In particular, we use call
termination charges to approximate the marginal cost of calls. Termination rates differ by
destination and are zero for on-net calls. We compute the cost of termination based on the
market shares of each operator. We apply the same split between calls to mobile (90%) and
to fixed (10%), and between peak and off-peak (50% each), which we used in respect of usage
profiles (Section 3.4). In the regression, we also use a set of dummy variables for operators
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and type of tariff, and their interaction terms. Our first-stage regression is shown in Table
7. The estimation results show that call termination costs have a significant impact on prices.
Table 7: Control function estimation results - voice services
Coeff. (STD)
Termination cost 1.30*** (0.16)
MTN 0.80*** (0.16)
Telkom 0.36* (0.18)
Vodacom 0.50** (0.16)
Prepaid 0.68*** (0.16)
Postpaid* Medium 0.18 (0.16)High 0.44** (0.16)
MTN*
Prepaid -0.28 (0.22)
Postpaid medium -0.21 (0.22)
Postpaid high -0.22 (0.22)
Telkom*
Prepaid -0.42+ (0.25)
Postpaid medium -0.21 (0.25)
Postpaid high -0.27 (0.25)
Vodacom*
Prepaid -0.07 (0.22)
Postpaid medium -0.14 (0.22)
Postpaid high -0.19 (0.22)
Constant -0.02 (0.14)
Number of obs 88
R-squared 0.68
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
An increase in termination cost by 1 cent increases the retail price by 1.3 cents. A positive
relationship between call termination and retail prices was also found in earlier literature (see
for instance Genakos and Valletti, 2015 and Hawthorne, 2018). We include the residuals from
the first stage regression in our demand estimation to control for endogeneity.
The estimation results for the multinomial and random coefficients models are shown in
Table 8. The price coefficient is highly significant and negative in both models. There is
significant unobserved heterogeneity in responsiveness to price, shown by a significant standard
deviation for the price variable. We also allow observable individual characteristics to determine
price-responsiveness. Low-income consumers have a higher elasticity of demand than higher-
income consumers. Black and Coloured consumers are less price-sensitive than White and Indian
consumers, after controlling for income. Xhosa-speaking consumers are less price-sensitive.
Consumers who live in cities and towns are significantly more likely to choose Telkom and Cell
C than Vodacom and MTN, after controlling for the quality of networks using operator dummy
variables. Being employed, and self-employed in particular, as well as having a telephone at work
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Table 8: Estimation results
Cond. logit Mixed logit Cond. logit Mixed logit
Coeff. (STD) Coeff. (STD) Coeff. (STD) Coeff. (STD)
Price -2.14*** (0.08) -2.00*** (0.09)
SD Price 0.76*** (0.03)
Price interactions Mobile interactions
Income 3-7,999 0.14*** (0.03) 0.23*** (0.04) 0.26*** (0.06) 0.24*** (0.06)
Income 8-15,999 0.07* (0.03) 0.20*** (0.04) 0.79*** (0.06) 0.82*** (0.07)
Income 16,000+ 0.03 (0.04) 0.16*** (0.04) 1.27*** (0.07) 1.35*** (0.07)
Black 0.36*** (0.07) 0.50*** (0.08) -0.89*** (0.13) -1.15*** (0.14)
Coloured 0.26*** (0.04) 0.26*** (0.04) -1.20*** (0.07) -1.37*** (0.07)
Indian -0.24*** (0.05) -0.32*** (0.06) -0.59*** (0.10) -0.70*** (0.10)
Afrikaans -0.10 (0.08) -0.13 (0.08) 0.06 (0.14) 0.10 (0.15)
English 0.11 (0.07) 0.10 (0.08) 0.01 (0.13) 0.07 (0.14)
Zulu+ -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.08)
Xhosa 0.57*** (0.04) 0.62*** (0.05) -0.90*** (0.08) -0.93*** (0.08)
Operator fixed effects Operator * Cities
Cell C 1.92*** (0.15) 2.08*** (0.17) 1.03*** (0.04) 1.11*** (0.04)
MTN 4.12*** (0.16) 4.14*** (0.17) 0.40*** (0.03) 0.49*** (0.03)
Telkom -1.13*** (0.21) -0.97*** (0.22) 1.16*** (0.16) 1.23*** (0.16)
Vodacom 4.04*** (0.15) 4.14*** (0.17) 0.26*** (0.03) 0.35*** (0.03)
Operator * Towns
CellC 0.62*** (0.04) 0.67*** (0.04)
MTN 0.27*** (0.03) 0.33*** (0.03)
Telkom 0.66*** (0.17) 0.71*** (0.17)
Vodacom 0.19*** (0.03) 0.25*** (0.03)
Mobile interactions
Age 26-50 0.05** (0.02) 0.07** (0.03)
Age 51-65 -0.50*** (0.02) -0.61*** (0.03)
Age 65+ -1.25*** (0.03) -1.55*** (0.04)
Male -0.35*** (0.02) -0.43*** (0.02)
Working 0.54*** (0.02) 0.68*** (0.03)
Self-employed 0.25*** (0.04) 0.28*** (0.05)
Telephone-home -0.25*** (0.02) -0.30*** (0.03)
Telephone-work 0.53*** (0.04) 0.62*** (0.05)
Western Cape -0.05+ (0.03) -0.08+ (0.04)
Northern Cape -0.42*** (0.04) -0.51*** (0.05)
Free State 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Eastern Cape -0.46*** (0.03) -0.59*** (0.04)
KwaZulu Natal -0.03 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04)
Mpumalanga 0.47*** (0.05) 0.57*** (0.06)
Limpopo 0.09* (0.04) 0.15** (0.05)
North West 0.07+ (0.04) 0.10+ (0.05)
Control function 1.78*** (0.04) 1.47*** (0.04)
Number of obs 636,891 636,891 636,891 636,891
Log-likelihood -166,357 -166,227 -166,357 -166,227
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 9: Own-price & cross-price elasticities, by operator - prepaid (2011-2014)
Operator Cell C MTN Telkom Vodacom
Cell C -1.44 0.77 0.01 0.76
MTN 0.19 -1.38 0.01 0.73
Telkom(M) 0.21 0.77 -1.77 0.75
Vodacom 0.19 0.76 0.01 -1.22
Table 10: Own-price & cross-price elasticities, by operator - postpaid (2011-2014)
Operator Cell C MTN Telkom Vodacom
Cell C -1.13 0.59 0.01 0.81
MTN 0.21 -1.17 0.01 0.81
Telkom(M) 0.22 0.60 -1.64 0.81
Vodacom 0.21 0.60 0.01 -0.92
Aggregate elasticities are calculated for each year between 2011 and 2014 (when Telkom Mobile was
present). The elasticities shown on the table are the average over the four year period.
and being young all make it more likely to take up a mobile service. Being older than 50 and
having a landline telephone at home makes taking up a mobile service less likely. There is some
variability in the uptake of mobile services depending on the province; living in the Eastern,
Western and Northern Cape provinces is associated with a lower probability of taking up a mobile
service than being in Gauteng. Consumers in the North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga are
more likely to take up a mobile service than consumers in Gauteng.
We use the estimates to compute individual-level price elasticities and then aggregate them
using the equations shown in Section 3.5.1. The demand for mobile services is relatively elastic
in respect of prepaid prices, shown in Table 9 but somewhat less so in respect of postpaid services
10. The own-price elasticities of demand are the highest for Telkom Mobile’s services, equal to
-1.77 in respect of prepaid services for example. Vodacom faces the lowest own-price elasticity
of demand. These are average elasticities for the period 2011-2014, since Telkom Mobile was in
the market in these years. The cross-price elasticities show relatively small differences in the
degree of substitution between mobile operators.
We use our demand estimates and termination costs to compute prices under the assumption
of Nash-Bertrand equilibrium using equation (13). The marginal costs, average prices and mark-
ups are shown fore prepaid prices in Table 11 and for postpaid prices (on average) in 12.
Vodacom and MTN have the highest mark-ups (79%). Prices imputed from our model are
similar to market prices. This means that our estimates of price elasticities are reasonable.
60
Table 11: Operator prices, marginal costs and mark-ups - prepaid (2011-2014)
Operator Marginal
costs
Market
prices
Market
mark-ups
Model
prices
Model
mark-ups
ZAR/min ZAR/min % ZAR/min %
Cell C 0.41 1.09 63 1.09 63
MTN 0.29 1.47 79 1.30 77
Telkom(M) 0.46 1.20 62 1.06 58
Vodacom 0.27 1.33 80 1.23 78
Table 12: Operator prices, marginal costs and mark-ups - postpaid (2011-2014)
Operator Marginal
costs
Market
prices
Market
mark-ups
Model
prices
Model
mark-ups
ZAR/min ZAR/min % ZAR/min %
Cell C 0.41 0.80 48 1.09 64
MTN 0.29 1.07 72 1.22 76
Telkom(M) 0.46 0.98 53 1.04 57
Vodacom 0.27 1.03 74 1.29 80
We consider termination costs to be marginal costs. Model prices are simulated from these costs using
iterated best responses. Simple averages of prepaid and postpaid prices over 2011-2014 are shown.
We then simulate how entry and regulation affect consumer welfare in different population
segments, in the following three counterfactuals. First, we remove Telkom Mobile from the
market. Telkom had a market share of around three percent by 2014, having entered in 2011,
which suggests a very small impact on consumer welfare. In the second case, we also remove
Cell C from the market, which leaves just two main competitors, MTN and Vodacom. Cell C
had a market share of around sixteen percent in 2014 and therefore had a much bigger impact
on consumer welfare. Third, we simulate a ‘no regulation’ scenario, in which termination rates
remain as they were in 2009. The simulations are conducted for the period between 2011 and
2014 using the iterated best responses algorithm.
In the first scenario, we find that the entry of Telkom Mobile had minimal impact on equi-
librium prices and consumer surplus. In the absence of Telkom, the average welfare loss per
minute is approximately one cent, which is very little compared to the average price of a call,
which was approximately one Rand per minute.
In the second scenario, the average loss in consumer surplus in the absence of Cell C and
Telkom is estimated at almost sixteen cents per minute, as shown in Table 13. If we assume
that customers on average make 30 minutes of calls per month, which is the usage profile for
prepaid customers, at an average price of R1.15 per minute, then an average’s customer’s bill
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Table 13: Change in prices & consumer surplus after entry & regulation (2011-2014)
Model
price
No Telkom,
Cell C
No regulation N
Price ∆CS Price ∆CS
Income
Income <3,000 1.08 1.11 -0.12 1.30 -0.21 18379
Income 3-7,999 1.19 1.24 -0.15 1.45 -0.25 24610
Income 8-15,999 1.25 1.32 -0.17 1.53 -0.27 21638
Income >15,999 1.26 1.36 -0.18 1.56 -0.30 23080
Total 1.20 1.27 -0.16 1.47 -0.26 87707
Settlement type
Rural 1.16 1.21 -0.11 1.40 -0.23 13840
Town 1.20 1.26 -0.14 1.46 -0.25 29105
City 1.21 1.29 -0.18 1.49 -0.27 44762
Total 1.20 1.27 -0.16 1.47 -0.26 87707
Race
Black 1.23 1.29 -0.17 1.49 -0.26 45452
Coloured 1.09 1.12 -0.13 1.34 -0.23 12434
Indian 1.12 1.16 -0.14 1.40 -0.26 5925
White 1.22 1.30 -0.16 1.50 -0.28 23896
Total 1.20 1.27 -0.16 1.47 -0.26 87707
Language
Afrikaans 1.15 1.21 -0.14 1.41 -0.25 23620
English 1.19 1.27 -0.17 1.48 -0.28 20475
Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele 1.25 1.32 -0.15 1.52 -0.26 13511
Xhosa 1.16 1.21 -0.21 1.40 -0.24 10137
Sth, Tsw, Tsn, Ven, Oth 1.25 1.31 -0.15 1.51 -0.26 19964
Total 1.20 1.27 -0.16 1.47 -0.26 87707
Province
Western Cape 1.18 1.24 -0.16 1.44 -0.26 11882
Northern Cape 1.06 1.10 -0.12 1.31 -0.23 4307
Free State 1.22 1.29 -0.15 1.49 -0.26 6848
Eastern Cape 1.10 1.14 -0.17 1.34 -0.23 12172
Kwazulu-Natal 1.19 1.26 -0.15 1.47 -0.26 16042
Mpumalanga 1.29 1.36 -0.14 1.56 -0.28 4574
Limpopo 1.26 1.32 -0.13 1.52 -0.26 4998
Gauteng 1.25 1.33 -0.18 1.53 -0.28 22090
North-West 1.24 1.30 -0.14 1.50 -0.26 4794
Total 1.20 1.27 -0.16 1.47 -0.26 87707
Iterated best responses is used to simulate prices for each scenario in each year between 2011 and 2014.
The simulations are run using termination costs as marginal costs, applying termination rates in 2009
for the whole period in the ‘no regulation’ scenario.
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is R35 per month. In this case, the average gain from entry represents 14% of the bill and less
than 1% of the average income of households (R9,758 per month). Overall, the consumer welfare
effect of the entry of Telkom Mobile is close to zero while the welfare effect of the entry of Cell
C is relatively small. The entrants did not price aggressively and were not able to acquire large
market shares.
The increase in consumer surplus as a result of regulation was significantly larger at 26 cents
per minute on average. Assuming, as above, a monthly average bill of R35 per month, regulation
resulted in a consumer surplus gain of 23% of monthly bills but less than 1% of monthly incomes.
While this gain is relatively small, the effect of regulation of termination rates resulted in a more
meaningful impact than introducing new entrants. Previous research has also found gains from
call termination rate regulation (such as by Genakos and Valletti, 2015). However, the effects
on consumer surplus have not been quantified before as far as we are aware.
It is important to consider how consumer surplus from entry and regulation is distributed
across income segments in the population. According to our estimates, the benefits of competi-
tion are not distributed equally in absolute terms. As shown in Table 13, the poorest consumers
earning less than 3,000 Rands per month gained on average 12 cents per call. Consumers earning
16,000 Rands or more per month gained 18 cents per minute. Relative to usage intensity, since
high-income consumers tend to use mobile services more intensively, they benefit even more.
There are also differences in gains in consumer surplus across race groups, as shown in Table
13. Black people gain 17 cents per minute, Coloured people benefit on average 13 cents, Indian
people gain 14 cents and White people gain 16 cents. We get a similar picture when computing
changes in consumer surplus by language groups, as shown in Table 13. There are substantial
geographic disparaties in the benefits from entry and regulation, which reflects the distribution
of income in South Africa. While consumers surplus among city-dwellers increases by 18 cents
per minute from entry, consumers in rural areas benefit by only 11 cents per minute. These re-
sults are consistent with our reduced-form analysis, which shows that entrants target geographic
areas that have higher-income consumers (see Section 3.4).
The effects of regulation are also not evenly distributed. In the absence of regulation, con-
sumer surplus among low-income consumers (earning less than R3,000 per month) declines by
21 cents per minute while those earning R16,000 or more per month lose 30 cents per minute.
63
There are also differences in losses between race and language groups, as shown in Table 13.
Again, the geographic differences are significant, since consumers in rural areas benefit by ap-
proximately 23 cents per minute while mobile users in the city benefit from regulation by 27
cents per minute.
Next, we also use the model to simulate the impact of entry and regulation on mobile
subscriptions in different population segments. We find that in the absence of Telkom, the
uptake of mobile services over the period 2011-2014 does not change. In the absence of Telkom
and Cell C, the penetration of mobile phones would be a bit lower, declining from 86% to 84%.
As shown in Table 14, mainly poor people subscribed to mobile services after entry. Among
people earning less than R3,000 per month, the lack of entry reduces penetration from 74%
to 71%. At the same time, in the segment of people earning R16,000 and above, penetration
declined from 95% to 93%. Entry also had divergent effects on subscriptions among people
from different race and language groups. The increase in uptake as a result of entry (between 2
and 3 percentage points) was reasonably evenly spread across provinces and between urban and
rural areas, likely as a result of the national pricing policies of the mobile operators. Therefore,
competition introduced by new entrants to attract consumers in the towns and cities likely
resulted in lower prices and greater uptake across South Africa.
The effects of regulation on the uptake of mobile services were more pronounced than the
effects of entry, and again low-income consumers benefited more. Overall, mobile penetration ab-
sent regulation declines to 80% from 86% on average between 2011 and 2014. Without regulation,
mobile penetration among low-income consumers would be 66% rather than 74%. Among high-
income consumers, mobile penetration would have been 91% absent regulation rather than 95%.
Thus, while high-income consumers benefit more from entry and regulation from a consumer
surplus perspective, low-income consumers benefit more from a mobile uptake perspective. Our
results suggest that introducing new entrants may be less important than direct interventions
that support lower retail prices, such as lowering mobile termination rates.
3.7 Conclusion
We study the distributional welfare effects of entry and regulation in the mobile telecommuni-
cations sector in South Africa, which has the highest level of inequality in the world. We use
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Table 14: Impact of entry and regulation on mobile penetration (%, 2011-2014)
Uptake -
model
prices
No
Telkom,
Cell C
No
regulation
N
Income
Income <3,000 74 71 66 18379
Income 3-7,999 84 81 77 24610
Income 8-15,999 90 88 85 21638
Income >15,999 95 93 91 23080
Total 86 84 80 87707
Settlement type
Rural 80 78 74 13840
Town 85 83 79 29105
City 89 86 83 44762
Total 86 84 80 87707
Race
Black 85 83 80 45452
Coloured 79 76 72 12434
Indian 86 82 78 5925
White 91 89 86 23896
Total 86 84 80 87707
Language
Afrikaans 85 82 78 23620
English 90 87 84 20475
Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele 87 85 82 13511
Xhosa 79 77 75 10137
Sth, Tsw, Tsn, Ven, Oth 87 84 81 19964
Total 86 84 80 87707
Province
Western Cape 86 83 79 11882
Northern Cape 77 74 69 4307
Free State 87 84 81 6848
Eastern Cape 77 75 72 12172
Kwazulu-Natal 87 84 81 16042
Mpumalanga 91 89 86 4574
Limpopo 87 84 81 4998
Gauteng 91 88 86 22090
North-West 87 84 81 4794
Total 86 84 80 87707
Iterated best responses is used to simulate prices for each scenario in each year between 2011 and 2014.
The simulations are run using termination costs as marginal costs, applying termination rates in 2009
for the whole period in the ‘no regulation’ scenario.
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six waves of South African survey data on 134,000 individuals collected between 2009 and 2014.
We estimate a discrete-choice model allowing for individual-specific price-responsiveness and
preferences for network operators. We find that the price-sensitivity of subscriptions to mobile
networks is affected by income and by factors linked to individuals’ wealth in South Africa, such
as race and language. We use the estimates of the demand parameters and individual price-
responsiveness to simulate market outcomes in the absence of a new entrant, Telkom Mobile,
which launched mobile services in late 2010, and without Cell C, which launched services in
around 2002. We then simulate the effects of eliminating the regulation of mobile termination
rates, which are the prices that mobile operators charge one another for incoming calls.
Based on our equilibrium model of demand and supply, we find that the adoption of mobile
phones in South Africa would be lower by about two percentage points on average over the
period between 2011 and 2014, without the entry of Telkom Mobile and Cell C. Thus, entry led
to a relatively small increase in the total number of adopters. On the other hand, the regulation
of mobile termination rates had a more significant impact on uptake. Absent regulation, mobile
penetration would have been six percentage points lower. The positive effect of entry and
regulation on the uptake of mobile services is higher for low-income groups. Without entry,
mobile penetration among low-income consumers would have been four percentage points lower,
compared to a reduction of two percentage points for high-income earners. Without regulation,
mobile penetration among low income consumers would have been eight percentage points lower,
compared to four percentage points among high-income consumers.
We also use the model to simulate changes in consumer welfare for different income groups
and segments of society. We find that while a ‘rising tide lifts all boats’, in that all consumers
benefit from entry and regulation, high-income consumers benefit more in respect of consumer
surplus. This is consistent with our reduced-form analysis, which shows that new entrants target
areas that have a higher proportion of richer consumers.
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing an equilibrium-based assessment of
the distributional welfare effects of entry in the mobile telecommunications sector. We assess
these distributional consequences in circumstances where income-inequality is extremely high.
The mobile telecommunications industry is of particular importance in South Africa and other
developing economies where there is limited fixed-line infrastructure to make phone calls and
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access the Internet. A growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the telecommunications
industry in South Africa, including high prices and poor Internet infrastructure, resulted in
market inquiries into competition being launched by the competition authority in 2017 and by the
telecommunications regulator in 2018. Also, in 2017, the South African government put forward
a proposition to award significant amounts of future high-demand spectrum to a regulated
wholesale open-access network (WOAN) in which existing operators would be shareholders,
instead of providing for new market entry or distributing the licences to current market players.
This idea has received mixed responses from mobile operators and other stakeholders.
Our analysis is an important contribution to this discussion by demonstrating that the two
latest market entrants were relatively ineffective in generating and distributing welfare among
South African consumers. Wholesale price regulation had a greater effect on consumer surplus
but also benefited higher-income consumers more than low-income consumers. There is an
urgent need for solutions on rolling out networks in low-income urban and rural areas to bring
more benefits to poor consumers and reverse the distributional welfare effects. The roaming
agreements between small and large networks do not seem to be enough. Further wholesale
regulation may be necessary.
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4 Substitution between fixed and mobile data amidst high levels
of poverty and inequality
4.1 Introduction
Mobile broadband is the main means of connecting to the internet in developing countries, where
fixed-line coverage is typically limited or non-existent.27 As a result, governments in developing
countries are seeking means by which mobile broadband penetration might be increased. One
such intervention is regulating mobile networks on an ‘open access’ (shared infrastructure) basis,
which is similar to the unbundling of the local loop in respect of fixed lines in many developed
countries. For example, in Russia, Mexico and Rwanda, the government forced the separation
of wholesale upstream mobile network services and downstream retail services by assigning
spectrum to wholesale-only upstream ventures.28 The government in Kenya considered a similar
intervention and the government in South Africa has proposed a wholesale open access mobile
network.
These interventions may offer a way to catch up with developed countries in respect of
broadband penetration. Moreover, the impact of mobile phones and internet access has attracted
a lot of attention among policymakers and researchers. Mobile networks are significantly less
costly to deploy and can be used to ‘leapfrog’ fixed lines for broadband access. For instance,
Aker and Mbiti (2010) and Blimpo et al. (2017) discuss the role of mobile phones for economic
development in Africa. In another recent paper, Hjort and Poulsen (forthcoming) found a
positive impact of broadband on employment and labour productivity in African countries.29
However, mobile broadband has physical usage constraints due to the limited capacity of
radio frequency spectrum, which is not the case for fixed-line broadband. As a result, mobile
broadband typically has usage limits and high prices per unit of usage (per gigabyte) which
27We consider fixed lines to be mainly copper or optical fibre connections to homes and businesses. There are
a relatively small number of fixed-wireless connections in South Africa, where the end-user device is at a fixed
location but the technology may be wireless, such as via satellite or other wireless technology. We consider that
mobile broadband is offered in South Africa using EDGE, 3G or 4G connectivity. Most connections over the
relevant period were 3G connections.
28Regulating open access to mobile networks is not limited to developing countries. For example, in the
merger between T-Mobile and Orange in the UK (creating Everything Everywhere, EE), the UK Competition
Commission insisted on remedies that forced EE to provide radio-access network sharing with Three UK in order
to preserve the latter as an effective competitor.
29Additional papers that comment on the impact of mobile phones on economic development include those by
Jensen (2007), Muto and Yamano (2009) and Aker (2010).
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results in lower usage per connection, while fixed-line broadband has significantly lower prices
per unit and higher usage per connection. There is therefore a question as to whether mobile
broadband can really replace fixed broadband in developing countries, or whether these two
technologies complement each other as appears to be the case in developed economies, where
most people rely on mobile and fixed broadband access together.
South Africa is an interesting place to study fixed and mobile substitution, because even
though mobile broadband is the main means of connecting, there are also limited-coverage
fixed-line networks. Fixed lines were rolled out in South Africa almost exclusively to Whites-
only areas during apartheid, which came to an end in 1994. Since then, the growth of fixed-line
networks has been facilitated by a more open licensing regime and the expansion of sub-sea
optical fibre cables, which were connected to the African continent over the past decade.30 South
Africa therefore lies between developing countries in Africa which have very few fixed-lines and
developed countries which have close to universal fixed-line coverage.
In this paper, we analyse fixed and mobile substitution for voice and data services. There
are many studies on fixed and mobile substitution of voice services in developed countries. But
there are no papers that consider substitution between mobile and fixed broadband access using
detailed individual-level data in a developing country setting, where fixed-line infrastructure is
underdeveloped and people mainly rely on mobile connections.
This research is useful for a number of reasons. First, the assessment of substitution or
complementarity between fixed and mobile networks can support ongoing market inquiries into
broadband services launched by regulators. For instance, the competition authority and the
telecommunications regulator in South Africa separately launched market inquiries in 2017 and
2018 into the cost of data services. Second, it is useful for understanding the means by which
broadband penetration can be increased and thus help bridge the ‘digital divide’. The ‘digital
divide’ arises within and between countries where access to technology is higher in developed
30Licenses were granted to more than 400 licensees in around 2009, when a court ordered that limited-service
licences issued under the previous telecommunications law be converted to full-service licences under the new
Electronic Communications Act, no. 36 of 2005. In respect of sub-sea cables, the Seacom cable, which connects
the North-East coast of South Africa with countries along the East coast of Africa, India and Europe, became
operational in 2009. The East African Submarine Cable System (EASSy) lands in the same area in South Africa
and connects with countries along the East cost of Africa, ending with Port Sudan in Sudan. Onward routes are
provided via third party cable systems. Services on the cable have been operational since 2010. The West Africa
Cable System (WACS) landed on the South-West coast of South Africa and began operating in 2012. The cable
connects South Africa to countries along the West coast of Africa and in Europe.
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compared to developing countries and is skewed towards high-income consumers within countries
(see, for example, Bulman and Fairlie, 2016). This is an especially important problem in South
Africa, where fixed-line broadband is available mainly in formerly Whites-only areas. Further-
more, we are able to capture at the individual level the role of factors that drive broadband
penetration, including access to computers and access to the internet at work or school, which
have not been emphasized previously. This corroborates survey evidence in South Africa and
other countries that identify the high cost or lack of equipment, such as computers, as being a
barrier to using the internet at home, rather than the price of subscribing to a service.31
We address these questions using survey data of more than 134,000 individuals for the years
between 2009 and 2014. For each individual in the sample, we assess whether fixed and mobile
data services are substitutes or complements, which depends on observed individual character-
istics. We estimate a discrete-choice model where households may choose one or both fixed and
mobile voice and data services. A key problem in the assessment of fixed and mobile substi-
tution is separating out correlation of preferences with true complementarity or substitution.32
We address this by using factors that shift the utility of fixed-line services without shifting the
utility derived from mobile. In particular, we use information on consumers having a fixed-line
at work or a gaming console (such as an Xbox) which shift the utility of fixed voice and fixed
data access respectively but do not shift utility of having a mobile service.
We find that on average mobile and fixed data services are substitutes. But there is also a
substantial share of individuals who perceive them as complements. In particular, we find that
fixed and mobile broadband access are complements for a greater share of consumers who are
employed, have higher incomes or have a computer, or have access to the internet at work or
school. Thus, our analysis confirms that in developing economies people with lower incomes
substitute mobile broadband for fixed broadband access. But at higher income levels and once
consumers acquire a computer, they will derive higher utility from combining both mobile and
31For example, in the general household survey run by Statistics South Africa, the most-cited reason for ‘not
having internet access at home’ is ‘cost of equipment is too high’ (26% of survey respondents that have no internet
connection at home). Only 6% of those that do not have internet access at home cite that their reason for this
is that the cost of subscriptions is too high. Further evidence corroborating this result is found by Research ICT
Africa who find in the ‘After Access’ survey that the cost of devices is the largest barrier to internet access in
South Africa (see report published in 2018 entitled “The State of ICT in South Africa”). For examples of similar
results from surveys in the U.S. see Hauge and Prieger (2010).
32See, in general, Samuelson (1974) and Berry et al. (2014) for a discussion on the challenges with identifying
complementary goods.
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fixed broadband access. We conclude that one of the ways of increasing both fixed and mobile
broadband penetration is by expanding access to computers and by making internet available
at work and educational facilities. In our counterfactual simulations, we show that this is more
important than reducing prices of mobile data services by 10% through possible regulatory
intervention. Furthermore, since we observe that employed and self-employed individuals derive
higher utility from combining fixed and mobile services, having access to both technologies would
increase welfare for higher employment levels. This is important since South Africa, like many
developing countries in Africa, has very high levels of unemployment (37% using the expanded
definition) which leads to high levels of poverty and inequality.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the relevant liter-
ature. Section 4.3 discusses the telecommunications sector and demographics in South Africa.
Section 4.4 discusses the data used in the estimation. Section 4.5 introduces the econometric
framework. Section 4.6 presents the estimation results. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
A number of papers consider whether fixed and mobile telecommunications services are substi-
tutes or complements. However, much of the literature is focused on voice services and relies on
aggregate country-level data (Ward and Zheng, 2012; Grzybowski, 2014; Briglauer et al., 2011).
There are also papers that analyse consumer-level data in order to assess whether fixed and
mobile access (mainly voice) are substitutes. Rodini et al. (2003) evaluate fixed and mobile access
substitution using panel data on U.S. households. They use a binary logit model to estimate
own- and cross-price elasticities of demand and find that fixed and mobile access (mainly voice)
services are substitutes. Ward and Woroch (2010) use panel survey data on U.S. households
for the years between 1999 and 2001 to test fixed and mobile substitution in respect of voice
services. They use various approaches, including a difference-in-difference analysis, to estimate
own- and cross-price elasticities of demand. They find that the two services are substitutes and
in a simulation find that universal service had a negligible effect on overall phone penetration
(fixed and mobile). Suárez and García-Mariñoso (2013) use panel data on Spanish households
for the years between 2004 and 2009 to analyse substitution from fixed to mobile access in a
binary logit model. They find that larger households and those with older members are less
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likely to switch to mobile. The authors also find that the availability of the Internet reduces the
likelihood of fixed to mobile substitution, while prices and expenditures have only a small or no
impact on the substitution decision.
There are also papers that consider fixed and mobile substitution in respect of internet
access services. Cardona et al. (2009) analyse survey data for Austria and find high elasticities
of demand for DSL services in areas where cable and mobile broadband are available (and lower
elasticities where they are not). Their main finding is that cable and DSL form part of the same
market but they could not conclude whether mobile broadband by itself can constrain DSL and
cable because it had low penetration in Austria in 2006. Grzybowski et al. (2014) use data on
6,446 households in Slovakia to assess fixed and mobile substitution. They find relatively high
elasticities of demand for fixed-line services, which means that the market for broadband services
includes mobile services. Part of the reason for this is that, in former Soviet countries in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE), the copper networks were of poor quality. However, none of these
studies consider Internet and voice services within the same model. Furthermore, these studies
do not allow fixed and mobile to be substitutes or complements.
Another stream of recent literature on telecommunications services allows modelling com-
plementarity or substitution of consumer choices. Liu et al. (2010) use panel data on 2,590
households in the U.S between 2004 and 2006 and develop a discrete-choice model that allows
for additional utility from obtaining two services from the same provider, and for inertia in the
choice of provider. They find that broadband, cable TV and local phone services are comple-
mentary. Moreover, consumers prefer obtaining these services from a single provider and they
prefer using the same provider over time. They also find that having an internet connection
at work results in a greater probability of having an internet connection at home. This may
be due to ‘learning effects’ where users of high-speed internet at work learn applications for
high-speed internet at home. In another paper, Macher et al. (2012) use U.S. household data
for the years between 2003 and 2010 in a bivariate probit model to analyse whether fixed and
mobile connections are substitutes or complements. Analysing cross-price effects, they conclude
that mobile and fixed connections are substitutes rather than complements. Grzybowski and
Verboven (2016) use survey data on about 160,000 households, collected between 2005 and 2011
in 27 EU countries, to analyse substitution from fixed-line to mobile voice access. While they
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find significant fixed-to-mobile substitution, their results show significant heterogeneity between
households and EU regions. They find stronger substitution in Central and Eastern European
countries, where the quality of fixed lines is poorer. They also find that the decline in fixed
connections has been slowed by complementarity with broadband internet.
Our approach is similar to the latter paper and follows Gentzkow (2007), where we permit
heterogeneity in substitution across households. This allows us to conclude whether fixed and
mobile voice and data connections are substitutes, complements or independent from each other
among different groups of consumers.
4.3 Industry
In South Africa over the period between 2009 and 2014, there was one partial-coverage fixed-
line operator (Telkom) and two full-coverage mobile operator networks (MTN and Vodacom).33
There were also two smaller mobile networks, Telkom Mobile (a division of the fixed-line in-
cumbent) and Cell C, which used a combination of their own networks and national roaming on
the MTN and Vodacom networks. All mobile operators’ services are thus available throughout
South Africa. At the same time, the fixed-line network is available mainly in urban areas that
were reserved for Whites only during apartheid, which came to an end in 1994. Fixed lines
are also available in business areas and in certain areas formerly reserved for Black, Coloured
and Indian people where Telkom rolled them out to meet universal service obligations which
were imposed on it in the late 1990s. Approximately 5.5 million landlines were rolled out to
households in South Africa until 2001 (out of approximately 15 million households in total).
In around 2001, the fixed-line incumbent began disconnecting households for non-payment. At
that time pre-paid mobile voice services were growing as an alternative to traditional fixed line
voice services, at least for low-income consumers (see Hodge, 2005).
Vodacom and MTN began rolling out their Global System for Mobile (GSM) networks in
the mid-1990s. Cell C entered the market towards the end of 2001, while Telkom Mobile entered
towards the end of 2010. Over the period studied, almost the entire population was covered by 2G
or 2.5G (EDGE) internet access by MTN and Vodacom, while Cell C and Telkom Mobile roamed
33There were certain other fixed-line networks, however they served largely businesses or small gated commu-
nities.
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on these networks.34 But the quality of the smaller networks was lower because customers could
lose connectivity when handed over to a roaming partner. MTN and Vodacom covered around
50% of the population with 3G services in 2009 and around 90% by 2014 and the roll-out of 4G
began in 2013 (see Figure 10).
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Figure 10: 3G and 4G coverage in South Africa, 2009-2014 (%)
Source: MTN and Vodacom annual reports. Note that EDGE (referred to as ‘2.5G’, though it technically meets
the standard for 3G) coverage was close to complete over this period for the MTN and Vodacom networks.
According to a survey by the official statistics agency in South Africa in 2017, approximately
60% of households report having at least one member that can connect to the internet, typi-
cally via their mobile phone. However, in the same survey, only a small proportion of households
reported having an internet connection at home (around 10%), which implies that mobile broad-
band is used by individuals but not the entire household.35 This low level of internet penetration
at homes reflects the persistence of apartheid policies which excluded the vast majority of the
population from basic services such as fixed-line telecommunications.
The lack of connectivity at homes may have led to limited usage of the internet. Almost 40%
of consumers that report having an internet connection had not accessed the internet yesterday
but rather accessed it 7 days, 4 weeks or 12 months ago.36 This may be because connectivity
34EDGE meets the standard for 3G but is often referred to as 2.5G.
35Source: Statistics South Africa, 2017. “General Household Survey”, Statistical Release P0318.
36Source: Respondents to the All Media Products Survey (2009-2014), used in this paper to analyse fixed and
mobile substitution.
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via one household member’s smartphone or dongle disappears when that member leaves the
house. Moreover, mobile networks have capacity constraints related to available spectrum and
thus implement maximum usage caps. This suggests that fixed-line broadband may be needed
for households to provide all members with unlimited always-on connectivity.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Survey data and demographics
We use six waves of the All Media Products Survey (AMPS) in the estimation. AMPS is a survey
of approximately 25,000 consumers each year between 2009 and 2014. An exception is 2013,
when data on only half that number is available.37 The total number of observations is almost
138,000 observations, before data processing. This dataset contains information on consumer
choices of a range of products and services as well as on personal and household characteristics.
The survey samples a greater proportion of higher-income consumers in urban areas than a
nationally representatitive sample would.38 Nonetheless, the survey includes large sample sizes
across race, income and other demographic groups (see Table 17).
We use the survey to model choices of fixed and mobile voice and data services. To do this
we need to account for the geographic coverage of the networks to define what choices consumers
have. As discussed in Section 4.3, over the period between 2009 and 2014, most of the population
in South Africa was covered by mobile broadband services. While a map of cellphone towers
shows coverage gaps, these are typically in sparsely populated areas (see Figure 11a).
We do not have information on coverage by the fixed network and we use the survey data to
define fixed-coverage areas. A map of Telkom’s fixed-line broadband exchanges shows that they
are concentrated in cities and towns. There are also a number of exchanges scattered in rural
areas, which were often rolled out to serve White farmers during apartheid (see Figure 11b).
During apartheid, the population was segregated according to racial groups, which were
Black, White, Indian and Coloured. These patterns of segregation have persisted in the post-
37The AMPS survey is a rolling six-month survey of approximately 12,500 consumers in each period. The
committee responsible for the survey omitted several questions used in our model in the July-December 2013
period and this made the observations unusable.
38This is an annual survey conducted by the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), now
called the Marketing Research Foundation of South Africa (MRFSA), on buyers of a range of products, in order
to match media companies (such as newspapers, TV stations and radio stations) and advertisers of the various
products surveyed. The data was made available to us by DataFirst at the University of Cape Town.
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(a) Approximate locations of cell masts (2017) (b) Telkom fixed-line local exchanges (2014)
Figure 11: Maps indicating cell sites and fixed-line local exchanges
Figure (11b) shows locations of 1,864 local exchanges identified by broadbandstats.co.za in 2014. Figure (11a)
shows estimates of positions of high sites and masts obtained from opensignal.com in September 2017. These
estimates are based on signal strength to smartphones that have the OpenSignal application installed. Note that
number of sites by operator used in the control function for data prices (reported in Table 18) uses number of
masts and high sites reported by the mobile operators in annual reports and other public sources.
Apartheid era, and we rely on this to define fixed-line coverage over the period we study here
(2009-2014). In particular, fixed-lines have largely not been rolled out or have been disconnected
outside of Whites-only areas due to the theft of copper cables in rural areas and non-payment
of postpaid services. As a result of discriminatory policies in this period, White people have
significantly higher incomes compared to other racial groups. Indian people were discriminated
against during apartheid but benefited from having more access to public resources and from
living in urban areas, while many Black and Coloured people live in rural areas with substantially
lower funding for education and healthcare. Indian people therefore have lower incomes than
White people though both groups have higher incomes than Black and Coloured people. Many
Black people were forced during apartheid to live in rural ‘homelands’ and had to carry pass
books to be allowed into urban areas, known as the ‘dompas’. These rural homelands were closely
associated with race and language groups, and provinces that integrated homelands continue to
be characterised by this.
We use this demographic information in order to determine whether a household has fixed-
line coverage. First, for the reasons stated above, we consider that fixed lines are available to all
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White households, including in rural areas. Second, we consider that fixed lines are only available
to Black, Coloured and Indian households where the following is reported on the dwelling: (i)
has a flush toilet inside or outside, (ii) is a house or flat (and not a hut or a shack), (iii) has a
water connection and (iv) indoor plumbing (a built-in kitchen sink) and (v) has an electricity
connection (see Figure 12). Furthermore, we consider that Black and Coloured households in
rural areas (i.e. living on farms etc.) do not have fixed-line coverage. These assumptions imply
that two-thirds of individuals in the AMPS dataset has fixed-line coverage. This number appears
to be higher than the true population coverage of the fixed-line network, which as discussed above
at its height covered approximately 5.5 million out of 15 million households in South Africa. But
we observe that the AMPS survey includes a greater proportion of people living in urban areas
who also tend to have higher incomes.
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Figure 12: Identifying areas with no fixed-line coverage (%)
AMPS survey respondents, pooled, 2009-2014 (N=137,321).
We dropped 1,951 observations where consumers responded having a telephone at home
while according to our assumptions they live in areas with no fixed-line coverage.39 We also
39We carried out robustness checks to see whether alternative means of developing a proxy for fixed-line coverage
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dropped 612 observations where consumers reported having a mobile internet connection and at
the same time declared not having a mobile network operator. In our model, households with
no fixed-line coverage have a choice set limited to mobile services. They can choose between
between no mobile, mobile voice only or mobile voice and data provided by one of the network
operators. All users within a fixed-coverage area are then also given the option to choose between
no fixed services, fixed voice and fixed voice & data services (see Table 15 and Table 16).
Table 15: Network operator choices made by consumers in 2014
No fixed Fixed voice
only
Fixed voice
& data
Total
No mobile 1,944 516 54 2,514
Mobile voice only
Cell C 858 141 84 1,083
MTN 3,343 320 182 3,845
Telkom Mobile 52 12 10 74
Vodacom 3,502 550 319 4,371
Mobile voice & data
Cell C 1,825 204 358 2,387
MTN 3,673 420 739 4,832
Telkom Mobile 101 20 50 171
Vodacom 4,046 601 1,094 5,741
Total 19,344 2,784 2,890 25,018
We test for substitution or complementarity in two areas: the first is for voice (the light gray cells, including for
example where a consumer chooses a fixed voice only service and a mobile voice & data service) and the second
is for voice & data, the area shaded dark gray.
The usage of fixed or mobile connections in South Africa varies significantly depending on
demographic characteristics (see Table 17). A large proportion of consumers that have computers
also have a fixed line or mobile service (48% of consumers that have a computer also have a fixed
line, whereas only 14% of consumers that do not have a computer have a fixed line). At the same
time, almost all consumers in our sample that have both fixed and mobile data connections also
have a computer. This is in line with the experience in other countries: the positive relationship
between access to the internet at home and having a computer can also be observed across
countries (see Figure 13). The lack of a computer has also previously been reported as a barrier
would lead to a different outcome. First, we removed the assumption that all White households have fixed-line
coverage. This resulted in 2,182 households having a telephone at home while not having fixed line coverage,
which is not very different to our baseline assumption. Next, we reinstated the coverage assumption in respect
of White households and removed the assumption that Black and Coloured households in rural areas have no
coverage, and find that 1,788 households report a fixed-line where there is no fixed-line coverage. Again, this
result is very close to our baseline assumption.
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Table 16: Fixed and mobile choices made by consumers 2009-2014
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Consumer chooses no mobile service
No fixed 4,561 3,827 2,821 2,481 1,107 1,944 16,741
Fixed voice 1,203 1,040 886 706 376 516 4,727
Fixed voice & data 83 67 64 55 40 54 363
Total 5,847 4,934 3,771 3,242 1,523 2,514 21,831
Consumer chooses mobile voice only
No fixed 11,633 11,737 11,740 10,656 4,789 7,755 58,310
Fixed voice 3,076 2,748 2,300 1,783 775 1,023 11,705
Fixed voice & data 1,730 1,435 1,305 1,006 411 595 6,482
Total 16,439 15,920 15,345 13,445 5,975 9,373 76,497
Consumer chooses mobile voice & data
No fixed 1,224 2,426 3,851 5,467 3,449 9,645 26,062
Fixed voice 558 815 986 1,185 637 1,245 5,426
Fixed voice & data 171 202 473 1,091 748 2,241 4,926
Total 1,953 3,443 5,310 7,743 4,834 13,131 36,414
Total 24,239 24,297 24,426 24,430 12,332 25,018 134,742
to the adoption of broadband services (see, for example, Hauge and Prieger, 2010).
Similarly, a larger proportion of individuals that have an internet connection at work or
school choose fixed and mobile data compared to those that do not. A similar result is found
by Liu et al. (2010).
As can be expected, the usage of fixed and mobile services increases with income which in
South Africa is strongly correlated with race. The proportion of consumers that use a mobile
service does not vary among racial groups but the proportion using fixed lines does. While 49%
of White consumers have a fixed connection, only 8% of Black consumers do. Fixed and mobile
choices among different language groups roughly follow the corresponding race group. While
choices of mobile are roughly similar among language groups, a significantly larger proportion
of English and Afrikaans-speakers (who are predominantly White, Coloured and Indian) have
fixed-line services. In addition, language and race overlap with geographic regions (provinces)
in South Africa.40
40There are eleven official languages in South Africa. The languages spoken most often are Zulu, Xhosa,
Afrikaans, English, Northern Sotho (Sesotho sa Leboa or Sepedi), Setswana and Sesotho. The languages spoken
by relatively smaller minorities are Xitsonga, siSwati, Tshivenda and isiNdebele. The main language in the
KwaZulu-Natal province, the most populous province in South Africa, is Zulu. Xhosa-speakers mainly live in the
Eastern Cape. Afrikaans and English are spoken mainly in towns and cities including in Gauteng province, and
Afrikaans is also spoken in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces, including in rural areas particularly
among Coloured people. A significant proportion of Sepedi and Tshivenda-speakers live in Limpopo, while
Sesotho-speakers largely live in the Free State (a province bordering Lesotho). Setswana speakers largely live
in the neighbouring North-West province. Siswati speakers and a significant proportion of isiNdebele speakers
live in Mpumalanga province which borders eSwatini (Swaziland). A significant proportion of Xitsonga-speakers
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Table 17: Consumer choices of fixed and mobile services, by demographic variables (2009-
2014)
Fixed Mobile F&M
voice
F&M
voice &
data
N
No computer 14 79 9 0 90,540
Computer 48 94 34 11 44,202
No Internet at work/school 23 82 16 3 121,203
Internet at work/school 40 98 29 10 13,539
Income <3,000 8 69 4 1 30,871
Income 3-7,999 16 82 11 1 37,743
Income 8-15,999 30 89 22 3 33,081
Income >15,999 46 95 33 10 33,047
Black 8 83 5 1 69,334
Coloured 27 75 19 3 19,398
Indian 55 83 37 6 8,981
White 49 89 35 8 37,029
Afrikaans 32 82 23 4 36,748
English 54 88 38 9 31,487
Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele 8 85 6 1 20,807
Xhosa 7 78 5 1 15,558
Sth., Tsw., Tsn., Ven., Oth. 7 84 5 1 30,142
Age < 26 years 17 85 12 4 39,098
Age 26-50 years 20 89 14 4 59,851
Age 51-65 years 36 81 26 4 23,117
Age > 65 years 54 65 33 2 12,676
No or some High School 16 73 10 1 61,467
High School or more 33 93 24 6 73,275
Unemployed 24 79 16 2 80,866
Employed 26 92 20 5 53,876
Not self-employed 24 83 17 3 121,874
Self-employed 37 93 27 9 12,868
Rural 7 76 6 1 21,031
Towns 32 87 23 5 67,915
Cities 22 83 16 3 45,796
Home owned 28 83 20 4 101,812
Home rented 16 86 11 3 32,930
Male 24 83 17 4 67,171
Female 26 85 18 3 67,571
Household size <=2 30 83 21 4 45,520
Household size > 2 22 84 16 4 89,222
1 earner in household 18 82 12 2 62,430
2+ earners in household 31 85 22 5 72,312
<=1 cell in household 19 59 9 1 35,311
>1 cellphone in household 27 92 21 5 99,431
No work telephone 23 82 16 3 120,465
Work telephone 43 95 33 8 14,277
No console 22 82 15 2 117,234
Console (e.g. Xbox) 47 95 32 13 17,508
Total 25 84 18 4 134,742
The numbers reported are proportions of consumers from a particular demographic having made the choice
indicated in the column title, except for the last column which shows the absolute number of consumers in that
demographic. Note that proportions are not adjusted for fixed-line coverage.
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Figure 13: Relationship between internet access at home and having a computer, 2012-
2016)
Figure produced using data from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Note that for South Africa
the ITU estimate of internet access at home is replaced by the estimate from Statistics South Africa. The ITU
reports data for the year most recently available, which in most cases is 2016.
We allow the demographic variables discussed above to influence the degree of complemen-
tarity or substitution between fixed and mobile voice, and between fixed and mobile voice and
data. The impact of these variables is discussed in more detail in Section 4.6.
4.4.2 Prices
Prices used in our model were obtained from Research ICT Africa (2010-2015) and Tarifica.41
In addition, we completed the database using an online archive service, the Internet Archive.
Prices of voice services were matched to consumers by payment method (pre-paid or post-paid)
also live in Mpumalanga and neighbouring Limpopo. Since the Zulu, siSwati and isiNdebele languages are linked
linguistically and geographically, we group these languages together as ‘Zulu+’. Sepedi, Setswana, Sesotho,
Xitsonga and Tshivenda are largely spoken in the Northern parts of South Africa, and we group these languages
as ‘Sesotho+’.
41Research ICT Africa is a non-governmental organisation that collects data and conducts research on telecom-
munications in Africa. Tarifica is a market-intelligence firm which collects information on prices of telecommuni-
cations services worldwide.
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and estimated usage of voice minutes based on cellphone spend. Prices of mobile broadband
were assigned based on declared intensity of internet usage.
First, we grouped mobile consumers as pre-paid or post-paid users based on the type of
contract they have.42 In respect of voice services, all pre-paid consumers belong to one segment.
Post-paid consumers were divided into three groups: low, medium and high users, according to
their declared monthly cellphone spend. Low-usage consumers are assumed to have monthly
bills in the range R1-150 per month, medium-usage consumers in the range R151-500 per month
and high-usage consumers above R500 per month.43
Next, we computed average prices per calling minute for each market segment. We assumed
different monthly usage of minutes for each segment: 30 minutes for pre-paid (1 minute per
day), 180 minutes for low-usage post-paid (6 per day), 540 minutes for medium-usage (18 per
day) and 1,080 minutes for high-usage consumers (36 per day).44 In South Africa, prices differ
depending on whether calls are terminated on the same network (on-net), other mobile networks
(off-net) or on the fixed network. For pre-paid and post-paid consumers we assume the same
distribution pattern of calls where 10% of minutes are terminated on fixed lines and the rest
on mobile networks. Calls terminated on mobile networks are distributed according to mobile
operator market shares. We also assume that 50% of calls are made in ‘peak’ times and the
balance in ‘off-peak’ times, for which there are different prices for some tariffs.45
42In South Africa, most subscribers are on prepaid plans and are typically unable to choose between prepaid
and postpaid because they do not meet the income and employment requirements for a postpaid contract. This
is a result of low levels of employment and participation in the labour force. According to the “Quarterly Labour
Force Survey” undertaken by Statistics South Africa (publication P0211), the employed population divided by
the number of adults in South Africa (aged 15-65 years), i.e. the ‘labour absorption rate’, varied between 41%
and 46% over the period between 2009 and 2014. The unemployment rate varied between 22% and 26% using
the official definition (active job seekers) while the expanded definition (i.e. including discouraged work seekers)
varied between 30% and 36%.
43The South African currency is highly volatile but as of December 2018 one US dollar was approximately
14.6 Rands. Classifying consumers into high, medium and low usage groups is a standard approach to segment-
ing telecommunications subscribers. The spending bands were selected to broadly reflect regular intervals and
available mobile packages, and so as to ensure a large number of observations would fall within each category.
Approximately 25% of postpaid customers fall within the first group, around 53% fall within the second category
and the remaining 22% fall within the highest spend group. The second category has a greater proportion since
almost 25% of postpaid customers spend between R271-R500 per month. Since there are many more packages
advertised in the R151-R500 spend level than above R500, it made more sense to allocate the R271-R500 category
to the medium-spend group.
44These usage categories are similar to the OECD mobile voice call baskets cited below, of 30, 100, 300 and
900 calls per month. The groups are also not far from minutes of use reported by Vodacom in its annual reports
between 2009 and 2014, for example, for prepaid and postpaid customers. Prepaid customers on the Vodacom
network used between 52 minutes and 116 minutes per month on average, depending on the year, while postpaid
consumers used between 182 and 240 minutes per month.
45This is in line with the OECD usage baskets mentioned above, which assume that 46% of calls are made during
the day, 27% are made during the evening and 27% over the weekend. In South Africa, weekend and evening calls
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This distribution pattern of phone calls is used to compute the average per minute price for
all pre-paid tariffs. We then selected the lowest tariff for each operator in a given year. We
assume that pre-paid consumers observe prices generated in this way when choosing tariffs from
different operators. We compute average prices per minute observed by post-paid low, medium
and high voice usage consumers in a similar way.
In respect of mobile data, the price is determined by the cost of bolt-on bundles, which
were typically purchased in addition to basic tariff plans. The operators did not differentiate
between prepaid and post-paid bolt-on prices over the period between 2009 and 2014. We
classify consumers into low, medium and high data-usage categories based on their declaration
of internet use in the survey. Low mobile data users reported being connected to the internet
via mobile. Medium users declared using mobile internet for instant messaging and email. High
users declared using mobile broadband for photos and video (in addition to instant messaging
and email).
Similarly, data bundles offered by mobile operators were categorized depending on customer
segment as low, medium and high. If there was more than one tariff plan available in the segment,
we used the lowest available price per gigabyte. Mobile voice and data customers could belong
to different voice and data profiles and prices were assigned accordingly. For example, a high
usage postpaid customer on the MTN network in 2014 paid R1.02 per minute for a voice call
assuming usage of 1,080 minutes as described above, and R79.80 per gigabyte for 5 GB of mobile
data.
Fixed-line broadband services were typically bundled with voice services which means there
is no ‘naked ADSL’ option. In most years, fixed-line broadband was offered for three usage
profiles: low, medium and high and we used these profiles to group fixed-broadband users. Low
fixed-data users reported being connected to the internet. Medium users reported accessing the
internet for services such as email, banking and news. High users in addition reported accessing
the internet for television and gaming. There is a subscription price for voice only, which includes
an allowance of voice minutes, and there are prices for bundles of voice and data. Where there
was more than one fixed tariff available, we selected the lowest-price alternative. For example,
a high-usage fixed data customer would pay R904 per month and receive 40GB of data over
are grouped together under the ‘off-peak’ period. Source: OECD, 2017, “Revised OECD Telecommunications
Price Baskets”.
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a 10 megabit per second line and unlimited voice calling minutes to other fixed lines.46 We
tested our results against different usage specifications and our estimates of price coefficients are
comparable.
4.5 Econometric Model
We model consumer choices of fixed and mobile voice and data services. We account for the fact
that many individuals use fixed and mobile connections together and formulate a discrete-choice
model for bundles of alternatives following Gentzkow (2007).
In our setup, fixed broadband connections are offered by a single network operator and there
are three or four mobile operators depending on the year. An individual consumer i can choose
stand-alone voice services on the fixed network (f = fv) or combined fixed voice and data
services (f = fd). Thus, with respect to fixed broadband, there are three choice alternatives
f ∈ F = {0, fv, fd}, where f = 0 refers to the choice of no fixed services at all.
A consumer can subscribe to mobile operator k and choose stand-alone voice services (m =
mvk) or combined voice and mobile broadband services (m = mdk). With respect to mobile
services, in 2009 and 2010 there are three mobile networks and seven choice alternatives m ∈
M = {0,mv1,md1,mv2,md2,mv3,md3}, where m = 0 refers to the choice of no mobile services
at all. Between 2011 and 2014, there were four mobile networks and nine choice alternatives
including {mv4,md4}. Therefore, in 2009 and 2010 there are 7 × 3 = 21 choice alternatives in
areas that have fixed line coverage and 7× 1 = 7 in areas that do not. Between 2011 and 2014,
there are 9 × 3 = 27 choice alternatives in areas that have fixed-line coverage and 9 × 1 = 9
choices outside of such areas.
Table 15 shows the number of consumers who opt for different choice alternatives in 2014.
Table 16 shows how the number of users of fixed and mobile services changes over time.
Individual i’s stand-alone utility from a connection to fixed network alternative f ∈ F is:
Vif = xiβf + αfpif ,
where pif refers to the monthly subscription charge for having voice services only or voice
46Uncapped data plans became available from the fixed-line incumbent (Telkom) towards the end of the period
analysed and were very expensive relative to capped plans.
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combined with broadband access and xi is a vector of individual characteristics influencing the
utility of the fixed service.
As discussed in Section 4.4, we define three different usage profiles. Each consumer that
has fixed-line coverage is assigned to one broadband usage profile (low, medium or high) and
observes two prices (in addition to no service at zero cost): one for the lowest-cost monthly
package of voice and another for voice and data.
The stand-alone utility from a connection to mobile operator, denoted k, is:
Vimk = xiβm + αmvpimvk + αmdpimdk ,
where pimvk and pimdk are the prices paid by individual i for mobile voice and broadband services
from operator k, and xi is the vector of household characteristics influencing the utility of mobile
services.
As discussed in section 4.4, we define different usage profiles for mobile voice and data
services. Each consumer is assigned to one profile and observes different voice and data prices.
The prices used in the estimation are voice call prices per minute and prices for one gigabyte of
data.
The prices for mobile and fixed-line connections may be endogenous. This is partly mitigated
by the inclusion of a rich set of consumer characteristics xi (see Table 17), which include:
demographics (such as income, race, age, gender, education and whether the home is owned or
rented); employment status, including whether self-employed or not; and geographic information
(such as living in a city, town or rural area). In the estimation, we also address the problem of
endogeneity using the control function approach proposed by Petrin and Train (2010).
An individual’s utility for a bundle of fixed and mobile services r ∈ F ×M from different
operators is defined as:
uir = εir if f = 0 and m = 0
uir = Vif + εir if f 6= 0 and m = 0
uir = Vim + εir if f = 0 and m 6= 0
uir = Vif + Vim + Γir + εir if f 6= 0 and m 6= 0
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The term Γir is the difference between the individual’s total utility from the bundle of services
r and the sum of the stand-alone utilities of fixed services, Vif , and mobile services, Vim.
For the singleton bundles, r = {0} ×M and r = F × {0}, we set Γir = 0. For the real
bundles, the services are complements if Γir > 0, substitutes if Γir < 0, and independent if
Γir = 0.47
We estimate one value of gamma for a bundle which combines voice services on the fixed-line
network with voice services on any mobile network, denoted Γiv.48 The second value of gamma,
denoted Γid is estimated for a bundle which combines fixed and mobile broadband services,
which by default comes with voice services. Thus, the second gamma is estimated for a subset
of users of voice services, as shown on Table 15.
The substitution (complementarity) coefficients, Γir, may depend on consumer characteris-
tics xi. We define Γir = Γr +xiγir, where Γr is the stand-alone value common to all individuals,
and xiγir represents multiplication of vectors which accounts for individual-level variation in
complementarity or substitution. The heterogeneity depends on the same individual character-
istics which determine utilities of fixed and mobile services.
A key problem in identifying Γir is separating the correlation of preferences from true com-
plementarity or substitutability. For example, when we observe consumers buying two services
we may simply be observing correlation in preferences rather than complementarity. In order
to remedy this, Gentzkow (2007) proposed using variables that shift demand for one service but
not the other. We employ one demand-shifter for fixed-voice services and another for fixed-data
services. The fixed-voice shifter is having a telephone at work, and the fixed-data shifter is
having a gaming console. First, having a fixed-line telephone at work means that members of
the household have a cheap means of contacting the individual (fixed to fixed calls are often
free or are very cheap in South Africa), thus shifting the utility of having a fixed line at home
but without affecting the utility from having a mobile. Second, gamers require very low-latency
connections, which were only possible using fixed-line broadband connections. Thus, having a
47At the time of our analysis there were no significant fixed and mobile bundles on the market, and so our
estimates are not driven by bundled discounts or other contractual benefits. Telkom Mobile offered fixed and
mobile bundles to some extent, but it was by far the smallest mobile operator with a share of 1% or less in the
AMPS sample over the period analysed. Thus, the likely effect of these bundled discounts is negligible.
48We do not separately estimate gammas for voice on one technology and voice and data on the other, since we
are mainly interested in fixed and mobile substitution in respect of voice services overall. We therefore estimate
a single gamma for voice services.
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gaming console shifts out the utility for fixed-line broadband without affecting the utility derived
from mobile data services. We denote the shifter for fixed voice as zi and for fixed data as wi.
More specifically, the utility from each of the nine bundles is specified as follows:
ui0 = εi0
uifv = xiβf + ziβfv + αfpif + εifv
uifd = xiβf + ziβfv + wiβfd + αfpif + εifd
uimv = xiβm + αmvpimvk + εimv
uimd = xiβm + αmvpimvk + αmdpimdk + εimd
uifv+mv = xi(βf + βm + γv) + ziβfv + αfpif + αmvpimvk + εifv+mv
uifv+md = xi(βf + βm + γv) + ziβfv + αfpif + αmvpimvk + αmdpimdk + εifv+md
uifd+mv = xi(βf + βm + γv) + ziβfv + wiβfd + αfpif + αmvpimvk + εifd+mv
uifd+md = xi(βf + βm + γd) + ziβfv + wiβfd + αfpif + αmvpimvk + αmdpimdk + εifd+md
In our model, individuals choose the bundle r that maximizes their random utility. Under
the assumption that the terms εir are i.i.d. type I extreme value distributed, the random utility
maximization results in the following logit choice probabilities:
sir =
exp (Vir)
1 +
∑
r exp (Vir)
(14)
where Vir ≡ uir − εir is the deterministic component of individual i’s utility for bundle r.
The choice probabilities form the basis of the likelihood function applied to the data. The
summations in the numerator of (14) are modified to adjust for the limited geographic coverage
of fixed broadband and different numbers of mobile operators, depending on the year, discussed
in Section 4.4. Defining yir = 1 if individual i selects voice bundle r, and yir = 0 otherwise, the
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log likelihood function can be written as:
L(θ) =
N∑
i
∑
r
yir log sir (θ) . (15)
where θ is the vector of all parameters to be estimated. The maximum likelihood estimator is
the value of the parameter vector θ that maximizes (15).
4.6 Empirical Results
4.6.1 Estimation results
First, we estimate control functions for voice services (Table 18) and data services (Table 19) in
order to control for endogeneity between prices and choices. In both cases, we use measures of
Table 18: Control function estimation results - voice services
Coeff. (STD)
Termination cost 1.30*** (0.16)
MTN 0.80*** (0.16)
Telkom 0.36* (0.18)
Vodacom 0.50** (0.16)
Prepaid 0.68*** (0.16)
Postpaid* Medium 0.18 (0.16)High 0.44** (0.16)
MTN*
Prepaid -0.28 (0.22)
Postpaid medium -0.21 (0.22)
Postpaid high -0.22 (0.22)
Telkom*
Prepaid -0.42+ (0.25)
Postpaid medium -0.21 (0.25)
Postpaid high -0.27 (0.25)
Vodacom*
Prepaid -0.07 (0.22)
Postpaid medium -0.14 (0.22)
Postpaid high -0.19 (0.22)
Constant -0.02 (0.14)
Number of obs 88
R-squared 0.68
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
costs as instruments, and we include dummy variables for the operators and market segments.
In the case of voice services, we use the costs of call termination.49 In respect of mobile data
49We computed the termination costs for each mobile operator as follows. First, we consider that 90% of calls
are made to other mobile networks (the other 10% are to fixed networks) and that calls to other mobile networks
are distributed according to market shares. We further consider that 50% of calls are made during peak hours and
50% are made off-peak, since termination rates were different for these two time slots. Using this information,
we computed an average termination cost per minute paid by each mobile operator in each year.
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Table 19: Control function estimation results - data services
Coeff. (STD)
Sites 66.41+ (37.59)
Medium usage -228.26*** (48.35)
High usage -418.60*** (48.35)
MTN -514.71+ (270.31)
Telkom 104.82 (91.15)
Vodacom -520.09* (245.65)
2010 -168.93* (76.43)
2011 -353.62*** (82.04)
2012 -452.82*** (97.01)
2013 -692.34*** (120.93)
2014 -731.32*** (134.55)
Constant 828.81*** (99.58)
Number of obs 66
R-squared 0.75
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
services, we use the number of sites.50 Termination rates are regulated in South Africa. The
number of sites does not respond to short-term demand shocks and is at least partly set in terms
of coverage requirements by the regulator. This is in the spirit of Czernich et al. (2011), who
use copper network infrastructure as an instrument for broadband penetration. Termination
costs and sites are positively related to voice and data prices in the respective control function
regressions. In respect of voice, this is consistent with findings in previous papers, including
Genakos and Valletti (2015). That there is a positive relationship between sites and data prices
is also reasonable, since the average cost (and therefore price) per gigabyte rises with the greater
number of sites rolled out. The R-squares are relatively high at 0.68 for the voice and 0.75 for
the data regression.
The results from the multinomial logit regression are shown on Table 20.
In column (1), the following results are shown: (i) three price coefficients; (ii) a dummy
variable for having a fixed connection from Telkom; (iii) fixed broadband speed associated with
a tariff plan and controls for quality; (iv) dummy variables for four mobile operators which are
estimated relative to not having a mobile phone; (v) a dummy variable for mobile data access on
top of voice; (vi) residuals from control function regressions for voice and data; (vii) the shifters
for fixed voice (having a telephone at work) and fixed data (having a gaming console).
All three price coefficients, for mobile voice, mobile data and fixed voice and data have the
50We collected information on the number of sites from operator annual reports and other public sources of
information, such as news reports.
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Table 20: Estimation results
Main effects (1) Interactions (2) Fixed (3) Mobile (4) ΓFMV (5) ΓFMVD
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Price - mobile
voice
-0.777*** Γ (average) 0.603** -1.400***
(0.024) (0.256) (0.191)
Price - mobile
data
-0.009*** Computer 0.785*** 0.473*** 1.461***
(0.000) (0.019) (0.030) (0.071)
Price - fixed -0.004*** I’net work/sch. 0.189*** 0.662*** 0.432***
(0.000) (0.026) (0.061) (0.048)
Fixed line -2.667*** Cities 0.071 0.106*** 0.070 0.201
(0.184) (0.098) (0.027) (0.101) (0.137)
Fixed broadband
speed
1.030*** Towns 0.350*** 0.122*** -0.060 0.005
(0.011) (0.097) (0.028) (0.099) (0.135)
Cell C -1.444*** Age 26-50 0.293*** 0.326*** -0.257*** -0.443***
(0.086) (0.065) (0.026) (0.068) (0.082)
MTN 0.068 Age 51-65 1.110*** 0.043 -0.407*** -0.882***
(0.089) (0.063) (0.031) (0.066) (0.088)
Telkom Mobile -4.227*** Age 66+ 1.929*** -0.371*** -0.490*** -1.495***
(0.096) (0.066) (0.040) (0.071) (0.116)
Vodacom 0.010 High school+ 0.526*** 0.949*** -0.293*** 0.018
(0.087) (0.043) (0.025) (0.045) (0.070)
Mobile data 2.535*** Rent -0.787*** 0.120*** -0.013 0.360***
(0.017) (0.051) (0.025) (0.054) (0.069)
Residuals - voice 1.065*** Working -0.303*** 0.720*** 0.052 0.283***
(0.031) (0.061) (0.028) (0.063) (0.079)
Residuals - data 0.001*** Self-employed 0.243* 0.064 0.057 0.424***
(0.000) (0.098) (0.051) (0.099) (0.111)
Fixed voice *
work telephone
0.401*** Coloured 1.214*** -0.286*** -0.319* -0.883***
(0.026) (0.144) (0.072) (0.150) (0.176)
Fixed data *
console
0.619*** Indian 1.727*** -0.214* -0.560*** -1.207***
(0.026) (0.149) (0.085) (0.155) (0.178)
White 1.310*** 0.434*** -0.415** -0.480**
(0.145) (0.075) (0.150) (0.170)
Income 3-8 0.338*** 0.019 -0.163* -0.465***
(0.057) (0.026) (0.065) (0.123)
Income 8-16 0.536*** 0.039 -0.339*** -0.444***
(0.064) (0.035) (0.071) (0.111)
Income 16+ 0.728*** 0.231*** -0.471*** -0.217+
(0.080) (0.051) (0.085) (0.116)
Afrikaans -0.743*** -0.256*** 0.124* -0.152*
(0.056) (0.045) (0.059) (0.074)
Zulu+ 0.041 0.148* -0.363* -0.584**
(0.160) (0.073) (0.166) (0.193)
Xhosa -0.545** -0.225** 0.159 -0.262
(0.168) (0.073) (0.175) (0.209)
Sesotho+ -0.275+ 0.097 -0.279+ -0.345*
(0.141) (0.071) (0.146) (0.172)
Female 0.594*** 0.546*** -0.462*** -0.418***
(0.038) (0.021) (0.040) (0.054)
Hh size -0.104* -0.694*** 0.013 0.067
(0.051) (0.027) (0.053) (0.069)
Hh earners 0.284*** -0.503*** -0.088+ -0.245***
(0.044) (0.024) (0.046) (0.063)
Hh cells -0.372*** 2.232*** 0.323*** 0.504***
(0.046) (0.025) (0.050) (0.090)
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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expected negative signs. The coefficients on the dummy variable for having a fixed connection
and dummy variables for mobile operators cannot be directly interpreted because of the interac-
tion terms with consumer characteristics shown in columns (2) and (3) and are discussed below.
The utility of having a fixed connection is higher for greater broadband speed. Having mobile
data increases the utility of mobile access. The residuals from the first-stage regressions are
positive and significant which indicates that there is a positive correlation between prices and
consumer choices of mobile voice and data services. The inclusion of the residuals from the
control function regressions results in a significantly more negative mobile voice price coefficient
but does not affect the price coefficients on mobile data or fixed services.
The coefficients on the fixed voice and fixed data shifters are significant and positive as
expected. They increase the utility of having fixed access but not mobile access, which allows
us to identify the Γir parameters. The stand-alone gamma coefficient shows that fixed and
mobile voice are complements (Γv > 0), while fixed and mobile data services are substitutes
(Γd < 0). As shown in columns (4) and (5), the individual-specific gamma coefficients vary
considerably. In particular, having a computer not only makes having a fixed or mobile service
more likely but also results in complementarity between fixed and mobile data services given
that −1.400 + 1.461 = 0.061. Having internet at work or school reduces substitution between
fixed and mobile data since −1.400 + 0.432 = −0.968. This may be due to learning effects, such
as learning the benefits of high-volume data use at work or at an educational facility (see Liu
et al., 2010). Note that we do not interact having a computer or having internet access at work
or school with the fixed and mobile voice gamma since these two attributes are unlikely to shift
utility for voice services.
There is heterogeneity between consumers across a number of dimensions. First, older con-
sumers are more likely to take up a fixed line service and are less likely to take up a mobile
service (at least above the age of 65). This is consistent with the findings of Macher et al. (2012),
who suggest that older consumers tend to spend time at home, and are therefore more likely
to use a fixed line. The opposite is true of younger consumers, who tend to be more mobile.
Fixed and mobile data services are stronger substitutes among older consumers compared to
those between the ages of 15 and 25, and this effect intensifies with age. At the same time, fixed
and mobile voice are weaker complements for older consumers.
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Individuals that have a high school (twelve years) or higher education are more likely to
choose a fixed or mobile service and are also more likely to see fixed and mobile voice services as
substitutes. There is no significant effect on the gamma for fixed and mobile data. Renters are
less likely than home-owners to take up fixed-line services and are more likely to take up mobile
services. This result is intuitive, in that renters are more likely to move between houses and
therefore are less interested in getting a fixed-line service, which often comes with an installation
cost and a term-commitment. At the same time, renters are more likely to see fixed and mobile
data services as weaker substitutes since −1.400 + 0.360 = −1.040.
Employed individuals are less likely to choose a fixed service, perhaps because they are not
at home as much to use it. But self-employed consumers are more likely to choose a fixed line
because they are more likely to work from home. Being employed and being self-employed in
particular mean that fixed and mobile data services are weaker substitutes.
Higher-income consumers are more likely to choose a fixed or mobile service. They see fixed
and mobile voice services as weaker complements, and see fixed and mobile data as stronger
substitutes. It may be that higher income consumers are more willing to pay the high usage
price associated with mobile data even when at home, thus reducing the utility from adding a
fixed-line data service.
This income-related pattern is also observed among race and language groups, where Indian,
Coloured and White consumers are more likely to take up a fixed line service than Black con-
sumers. White consumers are more likely than Black consumers to take up mobile. Afrikaans
and Xhosa-speaking consumers are less likely to take up fixed or mobile services than English-
speaking consumers. Similarly, Indian, Coloured and White consumers are all more likely than
Black consumers to see fixed and mobile as substitutes, whether for voice or for data.
Being female means taking up a fixed or mobile service is more likely. At the same time,
females see fixed and mobile voice as weaker complements and fixed and mobile data as stronger
substitutes. Individuals in larger households are less likely to take up fixed and mobile services,
possibly due to larger households being associated with lower average incomes in South Africa,
where children cluster around old-age social pension recipients (see Duflo, 2000).
The number of cellphones in a household makes taking up a mobile service more likely,
which is consistent with evidence on the presence of network effects in mobile adoption (see
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Doganoglu and Grzybowski, 2007). A greater number of cellphones in a household is associated
with stronger complementarity in respect of voice and weaker substitution with respect to data
services. This is likely because fixed-line services enable more fixed to mobile calls and have
greater capacity for cellphones to connect to broadband at home.
Our results suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity among individuals in respect of
the complementarity or substitutability of fixed and mobile services, as illustrated on Table 21.
In particular, 15% of consumers with a computer, and 27% of consumers that have an internet
connection at work or school, see fixed and mobile data services as complements. Substitutability
or complementarity also varies substantially by income level and race. While 50% of low-income
consumers and 39% of Black and 29% of Coloured consumers see fixed and mobile voice as
complementary, only 6% of high-income consumers and only 7% of White consumers do. The
reverse is true for data services: while 13% of high-income consumers see fixed and mobile data
services as complements, only 2% of the lowest-income group do. Almost 50% of young people
see fixed and mobile voice as complements, though this effect dissipates with age. Overall,
the pattern of proportions of consumers that see fixed and mobile voice and data services as
substitutes or complements follows the discussion on the estimation results above.
These results have important implications for developing countries, where interventions in-
tended to bridge the ‘digital divide’ are focused on mobile services. Our results suggest that
fixed lines are needed together with mobile services at higher levels of employment and when
there is access to the internet at work or school and greater access to computers.
4.6.2 Counterfactual simulations
We use our model to conduct counterfactual simulations in order to illustrate the effects on
broadband penetration of (i) reducing mobile data prices by 10%, (ii) expanding fixed line
coverage, (iii) rolling out computers, and (iv) expanding internet access at schools and workplaces
(as shown in Table 22 and Table 23). The results of this analysis show what might have been
possible if Telkom had continued the expansion of fixed-line coverage and met its coverage
obligations in the early 2000s (as discussed in Hodge, 2005). In addition, it was intended that
the fixed-line network would play an important role in providing access to the internet, facilitated
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Table 21: Percentage of respondents that view fixed and mobile as complements (Γir>0)
(1) Fixed &
mobile voice
(2) Fixed &
mobile voice
& data
(3) N
No computer 32 0 90,540
Computer 13 15 44,202
No Internet at work/school 27 3 121,203
Internet at work/school 13 27 13,539
Income <3,000 50 2 30,871
Income 3-7,999 34 2 37,743
Income 8-15,999 15 4 33,081
Income >15,999 6 13 33,047
Black 39 6 69,334
Coloured 29 1 19,398
Indian 2 0 8,981
White 7 7 37,029
Afrikaans 20 4 36,748
English 8 8 31,487
Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele 24 3 20,807
Xhosa 73 5 15,558
Sth., Tsw., Tsn., Ven., Oth. 29 5 30,142
Age < 26 years 49 10 39,098
Age 26-50 years 20 5 59,851
Age 51-65 years 12 0 23,117
Age > 65 years 6 0 12,676
No or some High School 43 2 61,467
High School or more 11 8 73,275
Unemployed 30 3 80,866
Employed 20 8 53,876
Not self-employed 27 4 121,874
Self-employed 19 15 12,868
Rural 38 1 21,031
Towns 19 6 67,915
Cities 31 6 45,796
Home owned 27 4 101,812
Home rented 23 10 32,930
Male 42 9 67,171
Female 10 2 67,571
Household size <=2 19 4 45,520
Household size > 2 29 5 89,222
1 earner in household 32 4 62,430
2+ earners in household 20 6 72,312
<=1 cell in household 22 1 35,311
>1 cellphone in household 27 6 99,431
Entire sample 27 5 134,742
For each individual, we add the Γir for each main effect and each control (interaction). Columns 1 and 2 show the
percentage of the group (row) who view fixed and mobile as complements (Γir > 0), for (1) voice and (2) voice
and data for each demographic variable. The total number of survey respondents belonging to the demographic
variable category is shown in column 3, and the total observations in respect of columns 1, 2 and 3 are shown in
the bottom row.
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Table 22: Fixed-line broadband penetration in counterfactual scenarios in 2014
100% fixed line coverage
(1) Base (2) -10%
price
(3) Base (4) Com-
puters
(5)
Maximum
No computer 7.7 7.3 10.6 22.0 27.3
Computer 47.2 47.0 48.3 48.3 54.8
No Internet at work/school 20.4 20.1 22.8 30.1 36.3
Internet at work/school 39.1 39.0 40.4 47.4 47.4
Income <3,000 11.7 11.5 15.9 23.2 27.7
Income 3-7,999 8.7 8.3 12.1 20.5 25.3
Income 8-15,999 20.3 19.8 21.8 30.3 36.5
Income >15,999 43.2 42.9 43.6 49.0 56.0
Black 7.8 7.7 11.5 19.4 25.2
Coloured 20.4 19.9 23.0 30.5 35.5
Indian 40.2 39.5 40.8 48.2 53.6
White 44.0 43.5 44.0 50.1 56.3
Afrikaans 28.0 27.4 29.2 35.9 41.5
English 44.5 44.0 45.0 51.8 57.9
Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele 7.9 7.8 11.7 20.2 26.1
Xhosa 6.4 6.3 10.4 17.6 22.6
Sth., Tsw., Tsn., Ven., Oth. 6.9 6.8 10.6 18.5 24.2
Age < 26 years 17.7 17.6 19.8 27.2 33.8
Age 26-50 years 18.8 18.7 20.9 28.1 34.2
Age 51-65 years 27.4 26.8 30.1 37.8 43.1
Age > 65 years 34.7 33.4 37.9 44.7 47.4
No or some High School 11.0 10.7 14.6 22.0 26.4
High School or more 29.9 29.6 31.3 38.5 45.2
Unemployed 19.3 18.8 22.0 29.4 34.9
Employed 25.4 25.2 27.1 34.3 40.3
Not self-employed 19.9 19.6 22.3 29.6 35.2
Self-employed 38.8 38.6 40.5 47.7 54.8
Rural 6.1 6.0 11.1 18.5 23.1
Towns 28.2 27.8 29.7 36.7 42.7
Cities 18.9 18.6 21.2 29.0 34.8
Home owned 23.6 23.2 26.1 33.6 39.3
Home rented 16.1 16.0 17.6 24.5 30.2
Male 22.1 21.8 24.2 31.3 36.9
Female 21.5 21.1 23.9 31.5 37.3
Household size <=2 24.8 24.4 26.8 34.1 39.2
Household size > 2 20.1 19.8 22.6 29.9 36.0
1 earner in household 15.6 15.4 18.2 25.7 31.4
2+ earners in household 26.5 26.1 28.6 35.8 41.6
<=1 cell in household 15.3 14.8 19.2 26.6 30.3
>1 cellphone in household 23.5 23.2 25.4 32.7 39.0
Total fixed voice and data 21.8 21.4 24.1 31.4 37.1
In column (1), base scenario probabilities are shown for fixed broadband and in (2) penetration if mobile data
prices were reduced by 10% are shown. In column (3), probabilities assuming 100% fixed-line coverage are shown.
In column (4), probabilities if there were 100% fixed-line coverage and all individuals had a computer are shown. In
column (5), probabilities assuming 100% fixed-line coverage, 100% have computers and all individuals had internet
at work or school are shown.
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Table 23: Mobile broadband penetration (%) in counterfactual scenarios in 2014
100% fixed line coverage
(1) Base (2) -10%
price
(3) Base (4) Com-
puters
(5)
Maximum
No computer 58.3 61.9 57.1 59.1 62.0
Computer 74.9 76.9 74.8 74.8 78.0
No Internet at work/school 63.1 66.2 62.3 63.5 66.8
Internet at work/school 78.4 80.3 78.3 79.7 79.7
Income <3,000 55.3 59.2 53.9 55.8 59.4
Income 3-7,999 59.7 63.3 58.4 59.5 62.0
Income 8-15,999 65.0 67.9 64.5 65.8 68.6
Income >15,999 74.1 76.2 74.0 75.1 78.4
Black 64.9 68.2 63.7 65.0 67.4
Coloured 59.3 62.5 58.4 59.5 62.8
Indian 61.1 63.8 60.9 62.5 66.5
White 66.2 68.9 66.2 67.4 71.1
Afrikaans 61.7 64.8 61.3 62.3 65.6
English 66.6 69.1 66.5 68.0 71.9
Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele 65.2 68.5 63.9 65.1 67.4
Xhosa 62.7 66.0 61.5 62.9 65.4
Sth., Tsw., Tsn., Ven., Oth. 64.5 67.9 63.3 64.7 67.2
Age < 26 years 72.4 74.7 71.8 73.2 75.8
Age 26-50 years 69.2 72.0 68.6 69.7 72.2
Age 51-65 years 55.1 59.1 54.1 55.4 59.3
Age > 65 years 37.9 42.3 36.7 38.4 43.5
No or some High School 54.7 58.6 53.4 54.9 58.2
High School or more 71.4 73.8 71.0 72.2 75.0
Unemployed 59.6 62.9 58.7 60.0 63.3
Employed 70.9 73.5 70.4 71.7 74.2
Not self-employed 63.4 66.5 62.6 63.9 66.9
Self-employed 71.3 73.9 70.8 72.4 75.9
Rural 57.9 61.9 56.1 57.7 60.6
Towns 66.7 69.4 66.2 67.4 70.5
Cities 63.2 66.3 62.4 63.8 66.7
Home owned 62.9 66.1 62.1 63.3 66.5
Home rented 68.1 70.9 67.7 69.1 71.6
Male 64.0 67.0 63.3 64.7 67.8
Female 64.4 67.5 63.5 64.7 67.7
Household size <=2 60.5 63.8 59.9 61.3 64.6
Household size > 2 66.2 69.1 65.4 66.6 69.4
1 earner in household 63.5 66.8 62.7 64.1 67.0
2+ earners in household 64.7 67.6 64.0 65.2 68.3
<=1 cell in household 48.4 52.3 47.1 49.8 54.5
>1 cellphone in household 68.4 71.3 67.8 68.7 71.3
Total mobile voice and data 64.2 67.3 63.4 64.7 67.7
In column (1), base scenario probabilities are shown for mobile broadband and in (2) penetration if mobile data
prices were reduced by 10% are shown. In column (3), probabilities assuming 100% fixed-line coverage are shown.
In column (4), probabilities if there were 100% fixed-line coverage and all individuals had a computer are shown. In
column (5), probabilities assuming 100% fixed-line coverage, 100% have computers and all individuals had internet
at work or school are shown.
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by local loop unbundling.51 The costs of rolling out fixed lines are likely affordable, even for
low-income households, due to relatively low labour costs in South Africa and the large number
of fibre to the home operators. For example, one challenger fibre operator in South Africa plans
to roll out fibre to the home using exisitng pole infrastructure in a large low-income community
in Johannesburg at a price of R80 per month.52
Furthermore, while we do not comment on the debate in the literature on the impact of
computers at home and at schools on educational outcomes, our simulations are useful in that
they may help us understand the means by which the ‘digital divide’ might be bridged. The
‘digital divide’ may be especially large in South Africa, where fixed-lines were rolled out mainly
to White households during apartheid and fixed-line broadband today is available mostly in
the same areas. For example, there is evidence that technology use in schools has positive
effects on educational outcomes in developing countries (Banerjee et al., 2007).53 In addition,
there are some papers that show that using technology at home improves educational outcomes,
though the evidence overall is mixed. There is stronger evidence that having a computer at
home improves computer skills (see, for example, Malamud and Pop-Eleches, 2011), which is
unsurprising. Having a computer at home and access to computers and the internet at schools
and workplaces therefore plays a role in the development of human capital, particularly in
developing countries. Providing access to the internet at schools and workplaces is not likely
to be very costly, since most communities that have schools have mobile network coverage, and
the mobile operators in South Africa use fixed-lines (often fibre) for backhaul to a large extent.
Rolling out computers to households would likely be more costly, since only around 22% of 16.2m
households have a computer. Such an intervention would nonetheless likely be affordable using
more recent low-cost computer technologies combined with the fact that 82% of households have
a television in South Africa.54
51Local loop unbundling was first recommended in a report prepared by the Ministry of Communications,
among others, entitled: “Local loop unbundling. A way forward for South Africa.”. This was recommended again
in the broadband policy issued by government in 2013, entitled “South Africa Connect: Creating opportunities,
ensuring inclusion. South Africa’s Broadband Policy”.
52The operator concerned, Vumatel, has rolled out an extensive fibre network in higher-income areas since
2015, together with more than 30 other new fibre to the home entrants across South Africa.
53There is some evidence of this effect in developed countries (see, for example, Goolsbee and Guryan, 2006).
The effect in developing countries may be due to high-levels of absenteeism among school teachers, which means
that students are receiving a lower-quality education than in developed countries (Bulman and Fairlie, 2016).
Chaudhury et al. (2006) find that teacher absenteeism in a study on Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru
and Uganda was 19% on average.
54Source: Statistics South Africa, “General Household Survey”, 2017, statistical release P0318. A Raspberry
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The results of our simulations are as follows. First, a 10% reduction in mobile data prices
results in only a small reduction fixed line data penetration, from 21.8% to 21.4%, reflecting
the fact the fixed and mobile data services are complements rather than substitutes for large
numbers of consumers. Second, expansion of fixed-line coverage (from two thirds to the entire
sample) increases fixed-line voice and data penetration but only to a limited extent, from 21.8%
to 24.1%. Consumers currently living outside of fixed-coverage areas are unlikely to take up
fixed-line services even if they were rolled out. Third, if all consumers were given a computer,
fixed broadband penetration would increase to 31.4%, and if in addition all individuals were
able to connect to the internet at work or school, fixed broadband penetration at home would
increase to 37.1%. Overall, these interventions would result in a gain of 15.3 percentage points
in fixed-line broadband penetration.
These outcomes vary depending on various demographic characteristics including income,
race and language (see Table 22). For example, expanding fixed-line coverage, access to com-
puters and internet access at school and work would increase fixed-line broadband penetration
among Black individuals by 17.4 percentage points from 7.8% to 25.2% but would expand access
among White consumers by 12.3 percentage points, from 44% to 56.3%. In expanding internet
penetration among particularly poor households, increasing access to fixed lines, computers and
internet at work or school may help to reduce the ‘digital divide’.
At the same time, a 10% reduction in mobile data prices results in an increase in mobile
broadband penetration of only 3.1 percentage points. Due to the complementary nature of fixed
and mobile data services for large numbers of individuals, expanding fixed-line data coverage
reduces the probability of choosing mobile data by only 0.8%. Expanding access to computers
and internet connections at work or school expands demand for mobile data services (Table 23).
Computers result in only a small gain in mobile data access (1.3 percentage points). However,
computers and access to the internet at work or school result in an expansion of mobile data
services by 3.5 percentage points. These benefits are reasonably evenly spread among income
and race groups.
The gain from a 10% mobile data price reduction, in increasing mobile broadband penetration
by 3.1 percentage points, is relatively modest compared to gains from expanding access to fixed-
Pi for example is available in South Africa for R235, a keyboard and mouse for R100, and both can be connected
to even old television sets via the 3.5mm jack.
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line broadband, computers and internet at work or school. The latter interventions result in a
similar (3.5 percentage point) expansion in mobile data penetration but also expand fixed-line
broadband penetration, which allows for significantly higher usage volumes at lower prices per
gigabyte, by 15.3 percentage points. In addition, expanding fixed internet access at homes in
South Africa expands individual access to the internet considerably more than mobile services,
given the relatively large average household size of 3.3 people in South Africa (rising to 4.3 in
rural areas).55
The gains from an increase in fixed-line coverage, ensuring that all households have a com-
puter and that workplaces and education facilities have internet connections available to indi-
viduals are therefore more important than reductions in retail mobile data prices.
4.7 Conclusion
We estimate a discrete-choice model of fixed and mobile substitution for voice and data services
in a developing country with high levels of poverty and inequality, South Africa. Our model
provides for flexible, individual-level variation in utility derived from fixed and mobile voice
services, and fixed and mobile data services. Our results show that fixed and mobile substitution
or complementarity depends on a range of individual and household characteristics. We find that
half of lower-income consumers see fixed and mobile voice services as complements though only
2% see fixed and mobile data services as complements. The pattern is reversed for high-income
consumers, only 6% of who see fixed and mobile voice as complements but 13% of who see fixed
and mobile data as complements.
We use our model to conduct counterfactual simulations in order to illustrate the effects
on broadband penetration of (i) reducing mobile data prices by 10%, (ii) expanding fixed line
coverage, (iii) rolling out computers, and (iv) expanding internet access at schools and work-
places. If mobile data prices were 10% lower, mobile data penetration would increase by only
3.1 percentage points and because fixed and mobile data are complements for large numbers of
consumers, fixed-line penetration would decline by a relatively modest 0.4 percentage points.
However, if fixed-line coverage were expanded to the entire population and computers were avail-
able to all, fixed-line broadband penetration would increase significantly by 9.6 percentage points
55Source: Statistics South Africa, 2017, “Living Conditions of Households in South Africa”, statistical release
P0310.
99
and mobile broadband penetration would increase by half of a percentage point. Furthermore,
having an internet connection at work or school would add an additional 5.7 percentage points
to fixed-line broadband penetration, and 3 percentage points to mobile broadband penetration.
These results suggest that expanding fixed-line coverage, access to computers and internet at
work and schools are more important than reducing mobile data prices by 10%.
Though we do not estimate the impact of broadband penetration on employment, an impor-
tant finding of this research is that being employed, and being self-employed in particular, makes
fixed and mobile data services weaker substitutes. Unemployment in South Africa is currently
over 37%.56 At higher levels of employment and particularly self-employment, more fixed-line
services will be needed. This is important in view of the results reported by Hjort and Poulsen
(forthcoming), who show that the expansion of high-speed internet access in African countries,
including South Africa, results not only in greater employment but also in greater productivity.
These results have several implications for regulators and policymakers in developing coun-
tries, particularly in Africa, who are focused largely on interventions in respect of mobile data
services. Firstly, it is more important to stimulate demand for broadband services by providing
the tools for using them (such as a computer) as it is to reduce the prices of mobile data services.
This means that policymakers and regulators might consider activities that ensure that individ-
uals have access to computers and internet at work and educational facilities in order to increase
broadband adoption. Second, we find that fixed and mobile are complements for large groups of
consumers. The number of consumers that see fixed and mobile data as complements is greater
at higher levels of employment and self-employment, and with more access to computers and
greater connectivity at work and at schools. This suggests that relying solely on mobile networks
to bridge the ‘digital divide’ is not enough. Policymakers and regulators might consider means of
expanding access to computers and internet at workplaces and schools together with expanding
access to fixed-line broadband.
56Using the expanded definition, i.e. including those who would take a job if offered even though they did not
actively seek work in the past month. Source: Statistics South Africa, 2018, “Quarterly Labour Force Survey”,
statistical release P0211.
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5 Conclusion
The effects of consumer heterogeneity on the impact of competition and regulation in the
telecommunications sector are explored here in three contributions. First, a unique dataset
on 2,773 fixed and mobile prices is collected and studied in order to test the effects of the reg-
ulation of mobile termination rates (MTRs) on retail prices. The results of this analysis show
that cost-based regulation of MTRs, the rates that operators pay one another to terminate voice
calls, resulted in lower retail prices in South Africa. While both prepaid and postpaid prices
declined by over 40% between 2009 and 2017, the period in which the regulation was introduced,
only 30% of this decline can be attributed to lower termination costs in the case of prepaid prices
(mostly used by low-income consumers). In the case of postpaid (used more by higher-income
consumers), 60% of the decline can be attributed to lower termination costs. The regulation of
MTRs also reduced the ability of incumbent operators that likely have market power (MTN and
Vodacom) to discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, generating ‘tariff-mediated network
effects’ that could lead to the exclusion of smaller rivals. This suggests that policymakers and
regulators in developing countries could consider reducing mobile termination rates and might
also consider intervening in respect of on-net and off-net discounts. This research extends the
existing literature by evaluating a detailed retail price dataset, where existing literature uses ag-
gregate, country level data (such as the widely-cited paper by Genakos and Valletti, 2011). This
provides more information on what happens when wholesale termination rates decline, including
the impact on on-net and off-net pricing differentials, which has not been analysed before as far
as I am aware. At the same time, this research would be improved by collecting even more data
on prices and product characteristics, and in addition on what price options consumers actually
chose, studied by Nicolle et al. (2018) for example.
In the second contribution, we find that high-income consumers benefit from a greater in-
crease in consumer surplus than low-income consumers as a result of the regulation of MTRs
or new entry in the mobile sector. At the same time, mobile adoption increases more among
low-income consumers than among high-income consumers. We also find that addressing market
power through MTR regulation has a greater effect on consumer welfare than introducing new
entrants does. In order to study this, we developed a structural model of supply and demand
for mobile voice services, and we computed changes in consumer surplus after entry and with
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regulation. Our results suggest that regulators in developing countries could focus at least as
much on regulating market power as on introducing new entrants, such as through spectrum
assignments. In addition, more could be done to ensure that low-income consumers benefit from
new entry, such as by imposing obligations on operators to extend network coverage to low-
income areas. This contribution develops several strands of the economics literature, including
on the link between telecommunications and economic development, discrete choice modelling of
choices of telecommunications services, the impact of regulation and the impact of competition
on welfare. While previous papers have analysed the impact of competition and regulation,
we are not aware of any that have done so taking into account consumer heterogeneity. We
estimate a mixed-logit model which allows for highly flexible substitution patterns among con-
sumers. Furthermore, previous papers typically consider developed countries, which do not have
the same high levels of poverty and inequality as is the case in developing countries like South
Africa. This research could be improved using better data on the precise choices made by con-
sumers in respect of pricing plans and on usage of services. Furthermore, it would be useful to
understand the importance of consumers choosing not one but two or more mobile networks to
connect to.
In a third contribution, we find that fixed and mobile voice and data services are comple-
ments rather than substitutes for large numbers of consumers. This is particularly the case
among higher-income, employed, and especially self-employed consumers that have a computer
or internet connection at work or school. We show in counterfactual simulations that in order
to drive broadband penetration in developing countries, it is at least as important to provide
access to computers and internet access at workplaces and schools as it is to reduce retail mobile
prices by 10%. This means that the focus on mobile services by regulators and policymakers in
developing countries, including the regulation of mobile services, may not be enough to bridge
the ‘digital divide’. The roll-out of fixed lines or the regulation of market power in the fixed line
sector may also be needed. This is the first paper we are aware of that studies fixed and mo-
bile substitution in a developing country like South Africa, where there is significant consumer
heterogeneity due to the high levels of inequality. Our model allows for significant flexibility
in consumer choices of fixed and mobile services, allowing the services to be complements or
substitutes at the level of the individual. A limitation of this research is a lack of data on tariff
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plan choices and usage of telecommunications services by individual consumers. Furthermore,
consumers may have more than one mobile network provider, and therefore may choose different
operators for their smartphone and laptop data connections, for example. Finally, this research
would benefit from data on the uptake and usage of new optical fibre network services and
fixed-wireless replacement services, which have recently grown in importance.
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